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Sexual Harms without Misogyny 
Deborah M. Weiss† 
Claims of sexual injury are always viewed through the twin lenses 
of sexual morality and sexual politics. Central to each is a narrative of 
what constitutes a sexual harm. 
Traditional society assigned to women the unenviable role of polic-
ing sexuality. To this end, its legal system assessed sexual harm from 
the perspective of the double standard, which admired men and stigma-
tized women for engaging readily in sex. Sexual harm was thus a wrong 
against a woman’s chastity and rape was the only recognized sexual 
injury.  A rape conviction required showing not that a man’s motives 
were blameworthy but that a woman’s virtue was beyond reproach, her 
lack of consent demonstrated by her sexual history and by a display of 
the “utmost” resistance.1 
First-wave feminists of the Victorian and Progressive eras rejected 
the double standard and its inevitable division of women into two clas-
ses, “the protected and refined ladies . . . and those poor outcast daugh-
ters of the people whom [men] purchase with money.”2 While accepting 
the notion of sexual harm as an injury to chastity, they advocated a sex-
neutral standard of sexual restraint grounded in Christian doctrine. 
The next wave of sex law reform began during the 1950s and was 
grounded in a sex-neutral standard of sexual autonomy that freed 
women from the constraints of the double standard but failed to provide 
a compelling secular narrative of sexual harm to replace religious doc-
trines justifying sexual restraint.3 
 
 †  Director, Workforce Science Project, Searle Center on Law, Regulation, and Economic 
Growth, Northwestern Pritzker School of Law. Megan Smith Richardson provided truly outstand-
ing research and input for this paper. 
 1 STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX: THE CULTURE OF INTIMIDATION AND THE 
FAILURE OF LAW 17–47 (1988). See also Jed Rubenfeld, The Riddle of Rape-by-Deception and the 
Myth of Sexual Autonomy, 122 Yale L. J. 1372, 1391–92 (2013). 
 2 Josephine Butler, Social Purity, in THE SEXUALITY DEBATES 170 (Sheila Jeffreys ed., 1987). 
 3 Martin S. Weinberg, Rochelle Ganz Swensson & Sue Kiefer Hammersmith, Sexual Auton-
omy and the Status of Women: Models of Female Sexuality in U.S. Sex Manuals from 1950 to 1980, 
30 SOC. PROBLEMS. 312, 312–13 (1983). 
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First-wave feminism and sexual autonomy theory achieved some 
important sex law reforms, notably the raising of the age of consent 
from its appalling historical norm of ten or twelve. Still, the law of rape, 
with its focus on the victim’s behavior, proved hard to change. Courts 
began in theory to recognize civil actions for sexual harassment, but so 
grudgingly that recovery was virtually impossible. 
In response to these failures, feminists in the seventies argued that 
sex-neutral theories of sexual autonomy failed to identify the critical 
role of sexuality in the subjugation of women. Male sexual advances, 
they argued, were often or even always motivated not by sexual passion 
but by a desire to humiliate and subordinate women. This dominance 
framework supplied a secular theory of sexual harm, an element criti-
cally missing from early discussions of sexual autonomy. The source of 
sexual harm, from this perspective, was located in the intent of the male 
actor, shifting inquiry from female to male motives. 
The prevailing public narrative of sexual harm became an odd syn-
thesis of themes from dominance theory and sexual autonomy theory. 
That narrative accepted one key principle from the most radical domi-
nance model, the strong misogyny narrative: all sexual harm resulted 
from men’s generalized desire to degrade and exert power over all 
women. However, public opinion rejected the idea that such motives 
pervaded heterosexual interaction. Thus, men were divided into two 
groups: good actors conformed to the norms of the sexual autonomy 
model, while bad actors fit the model of strong misogyny theory and 
were driven by an all-encompassing animus towards women as a group. 
By providing a model of sexual harm, this hybrid misogyny model 
succeeded where autonomy theories had failed and produced a seismic 
shift in both public and judicial attitudes. Under its influence, the law 
of rape finally began to undergo a period of significant reform, with 
changes such as rape shield laws that shifted legal inquiry away from 
the character of the victim. Perhaps most dramatically, courts began to 
increase substantially the scope of liability for sexual harassment, au-
thorizing recovery for non-economic harm through hostile environment 
theory. 
However compelling, I argue, the hybrid misogyny narrative is in-
complete. By locating the problem of sexual harm solely in the actions 
of deviant misogynists, it impeded recognition of the damage that can 
be done by flawed but not evil men, especially in situations of power 
created by the workplace. When applied to workplace settings,4 the hy-
brid misogyny narrative paved the way to judicial expansion of sexual 
harassment liability, but also to some deeply misguided doctrines. 
 
 4 In this Article, I focus on the limits of the misogyny paradigm in sexual harassment law. 
Katharine Baker has similarly argued that even rape law has been distorted by overstating the 
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In this article I will discuss three of these distortions. First, the 
focus on misogynistic motive led courts to overlook the importance of 
objective power differentials and thus failed to distinguish adequately 
between supervisor and coworker cases. Early sexual harassment cases 
imposed liability only in cases of quid pro quo, where benefits or detri-
ments of the job were explicitly conditioned on submission to sexual de-
mands. In extending this doctrine, the Supreme Court might well have 
preserved a distinction between the acts of supervisors and those of 
coworkers, but it did not, instead providing a single doctrine, hostile 
environment theory, that was applicable to both supervisors and 
coworkers.5 Judicial deprecation of the importance of implied coercion 
worsened when the Court handed down rules governing agency liability 
that made recovery for supervisory conduct only slightly easier than for 
coworker conduct. 
Second, the notion that all harm results from misogynistic animus 
has prevented recovery in cases in which the defendant’s actions, how-
ever harmful, were motivated not by animus but by a genuine romantic 
interest in the plaintiff that was ultimately rejected, sometimes after a 
consensual affair. At that point, the defendant began to engage in work-
place behavior that was harmful to the plaintiff, but that was not, 
viewed in isolation from the sexual rejection, hostile or misogynistic. 
Courts typically reject liability in these cases, reasoning that thwarted 
affection rather than generalized animus towards women motivated the 
defendant. Yet Title VII does not itself contain any requirement that 
the plaintiff prove animus but rests liability on a showing that a de-
fendant acted “because of” sex.6 The strong misogyny narrative in effect 
adds to the plaintiff’s burden by requiring her to prove an element that 
is not to be found in Title VII or Supreme Court opinions. 
Finally, the picture of a unitary sexualized misogyny, directed 
against all women, has obstructed efforts to develop defensible doc-
trines governing admission of “me-too” evidence from women other than 
the plaintiff, which exponentially improve the chances of success by a 
harassment plaintiff. The law disfavors but does not wholly disallow 
evidence of prior bad acts, and such evidence has been increasingly al-
lowed in the past ten years under a variety of theories. In response, 
defendants have recently begun to produce rebuttal witnesses who tes-
tify to the defendant’s respectful treatment of women. A strong misog-
yny theory that treats sexual harassment merely as a specific manifes-
tation of more generalized misogyny cannot justify the exclusion of 
 
malignancy of rapists’ motives. Katharine K. Baker, Once a Rapist? Motivational Evidence and 
Relevancy in Rape Law, 110 Harvard Law Review 563 (1997). 
 5 Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986). 
 6 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998). 
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defendant me-too evidence, since it has tremendous difficulty explain-
ing why a man would single out some women while leaving others alone. 
As a purely legal matter, these issues might be handled by carefully 
targeted doctrinal arguments. Even judges, however, are influenced by 
narratives. Moreover, public reaction to the #MeToo movement sug-
gests that the misogyny model may be engendering a worrisome back-
lash. Some of this may be dismissed as the inevitable opposition that 
reform movements always encounter, but some concerns seem legiti-
mate. The double standard and traditional legal doctrine focused al-
most entirely on the blameworthiness of the victim’s conduct. Misogyny 
theory turns the tables too completely, assimilating all sexual harm to 
the paradigm of rape, a crime of the most profound blameworthiness. 
Though it effectively blocks attacks on victims, it encourages a moraliz-
ing stance towards the conduct of even those defendants whose behav-
ior, though an appropriate basis for legal liability, falls far short of rape. 
And moral opprobrium in excess of what is warranted erodes public 
support and invites resistance. 
The history of the law of sexual harm suggests that narratives mat-
ter, and new narratives are needed. In highly charged areas of law, 
judges will have difficulty applying doctrines without support from a 
moral framework that makes sense to them and fits the facts of the case 
before them. If #MeToo is to usher in a new phase of sex law reform, it 
must construct new and more nuanced narratives of sexual harm that 
go beyond misogyny and sexual autonomy. 
One central priority is the development of a narrative about what 
situations are sufficiently coercive to require state supervision through 
legal intervention. Past waves of legal reform have had great success in 
passing laws that single out statuses and contexts that are unaccepta-
bly coercive. Liberal theorists have labored mightily to provide a more 
cohesive account of coercion without complete success.7 If the ball can-
not be moved on theory, perhaps at least more compelling stories can 
be constructed. 
A second priority is to resurrect what the Victorians knew: most 
misogynists construct two kinds of girls, the pure and the sullied. Mi-
sogyny is not simply about hating women, it is about dividing them. 
 
 7 See, e.g., Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Consent and Coercion, 50 Ariz. St. L.J. 951, 951–92 
(2018) (proposing a “normative impairment” definition of coercion that focuses on both the “blame-
worthiness of the coercer” and the “involuntariness of the consenter’s choice”); Rubenfeld, supra 
note 1, at 1412 (pointing out the incomplete definition of coercion and suggesting supplementing 
it with consideration of whether sexual activity involved “deception”); Michal Buchhandler-Raph-
ael, Criminalizing Coerced Submission in the Workplace and in the Academy, 19 Colum. J. Gender 
& L. 409, 437–38, 442 (2010) (advocating for a model of sexual coercion that considers a variety of 
factors, i.e., economic inequality). 
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 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the hybrid misogyny nar-
rative does not advance the extraordinarily challenging cause of provid-
ing a secular morality that acknowledges the emotional dangerousness 
of sex not only when it is casual but even more so when it is not. Sex 
has consequences, both for men and for women, and a society that fails 
to provide a moral framework for sexual behavior does so at its peril. 
I. NARRATIVES MATTER 
Title VII prohibits employers from adversely affecting the terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment because of sex.8 A sexual har-
assment complainant must allege and prove behavior that caused harm 
to the terms or conditions of employment; was attributable to the em-
ployer; and had a causal nexus to her sex. In practice, the theory of 
harm has proven to be the most important of these elements and exerts 
a kind of halo effect on the theoretically distinct elements of causation, 
agency, and proof. Courts that find harm seem willing to stretch to find 
other elements satisfied. Courts that find no harm seem to set impossi-
bly high standards for other elements. 
Sexual harm is unavoidably viewed against the background of 
views about sexuality and relationships between men and women. Over 
the last two centuries a series of legal efforts have attempted to control 
sexual harms,9 each responding to the dominant moral framework of its 
time with a narrative on the nature and causes of these harms. 
The overwhelming majority of human societies have imposed a 
double standard on the sexual behavior of males and females, with 
males invariably the beneficiary of the more permissive norm.10 None-
theless, the degree of inequity as well as numerous other details of the 
double standard has varied widely among societies. For present pur-
poses, the relevant double standard is that of the Anglo-American world 
prior to the mid-twentieth century, to which I refer as traditional, alt-
hough it is not in all respects a universal tradition. 
Traditional Anglo-American sexual mores reflect a tension between 
two perspectives, the Christian and that of popular mores. Both were 
united in assigning importance to the regulation of sexual behavior but 
they differed in their demands on men’s self-control and in turn in the 
 
 8 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e–2(a) (1964). 
 9 I speak in this article primarily of sexual harms to women. This focus is not to minimize 
the importance of protections against sexual harms to others, including men and gender noncon-
formists. However, the relation of these to harms to women is complex and beyond the scope of 
this article. 
 10 Gwen J. Broude, Extramarital Sex Norms in Cross-Cultural Perspective, 3 BEHAVIOR 
SCIENCE RESEARCH 181, 182 (1980). 
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burdens they placed on women. Christianity rejected the double stand-
ard, preaching chastity, in the sense of abstinence from non-marital sex, 
for both men and women. Social norms likewise restricted female sexu-
ality to marriage but leant strongly towards the double standard. Men 
were expected, permitted, and encouraged to pursue with vigor every 
opportunity for sexual activity, while women were correspondingly ex-
pected to resist these efforts.11 In the public’s mind, this double stand-
ard was simply an entitlement of masculinity,12 while intellectual and 
religious perspectives generally saw sexual restraint as a requisite of 
family stability.13 
The balance between Christianity and the double standard vacil-
lated over the years, but before the Victorian era the double standard 
dominated both public opinion and the law. Males were assigned virtu-
ally no responsibility for controlling their own sexuality, and social 
norms accepted the existence of a class of vilified prostitutes14 to satisfy 
male lust in order to protect the virtue of good women. The burden was 
placed on individual women to demonstrate that they belonged to the 
protected class of ladies rather than among the fallen. 
Sex law reflected the tensions between these frameworks. Under 
the influence of Christianity, traditional Anglo-American law nomi-
nally placed stringent limits on sexual activity by both sexes, prohibit-
ing fornication, adultery, bigamy, and contraception. However, these 
laws operated more harshly against women than men both by their 
terms and by custom.15 Other laws forthrightly buttressed the double 
standard and protected the right of males, especially wealthy ones, to 
wide sexual access to females. Laws against prostitution fell far more 
harshly on sex workers than on their clients.16 For hundreds of years, 
the Anglo-American age of consent was ten or twelve.17 
 
 11 See generally Keith Thomas, The Double Standard, 20 J. OF THE HIST. OF IDEAS 195 (Apr. 
1959) (examining the evolution of the double standard). 
 12 Id. 
 13 At a minimum, female chastity was needed to ensure certainty of paternity, a condition of 
inducing men to care for their children. DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF ON HUMAN NATURE 331–32 
(T.H. Green & T.H. Grose eds., Longmans, Green & Co. 1874) (1738). Hume, who is sometimes 
regarded as a protofeminist, seems to have regarded the double standard as necessary but unfair. 
 14 The choice between the terms “prostitute” and “sex worker” is a difficult one. The former 
carries strong and undesirable connotations of disgrace and moral blame, and to avoid these some 
Victorian reformers substituted the term Magdalenism. However, the generally preferable “sex 
worker” is anachronistic in contexts that describe the attitudes of earlier periods. My choice of 
terminology reflects this tradeoff. 
 15 Adultery, for example, was typically grounds for divorce for the wronged husband but not 
the wronged wife, and in some circles the failure of a married man to keep a mistress was regarded 
as unmanly. Thomas, supra note 11, at 195, 199. 
 16 Id. at 198. 
 17 MARY E. ODEM, DELINQUENT DAUGHTERS: PROTECTING AND POLICING ADOLESCENT 
FEMALE SEXUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1885–1920 (University of North Carolina Press, 2d ed. 
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The law of rape reflected the wholly male concerns that women 
were inclined to make false charges of rape that were hard to rebut.18 
The core definition of rape was sexual intercourse that was both forcible 
and without consent.19 Victims were, as is well known, required to resist 
strenuously, often to the utmost, a condition not always met even in 
instances of submission to credible threats of deadly force.20 Many ju-
risdictions imposed further requirements unique to rape cases: imme-
diate complaints; eyewitnesses or physical evidence; and cautionary in-
structions to the jury.21 The victim’s prior behavior, both sexual and 
otherwise, was open to virtually every possible type of prejudicial ques-
tioning at trial.22 
The balance began to shift with the Victorians, who stressed the 
critical role that women played in the social order. The image of the 
angel in the house23 whose domestic virtues civilized men24 has been 
much mocked by later feminists as a cult of domesticity that fetishized 
female submissiveness. Compared with what came decades later, these 
early forms of separate spheres ideology had elements that were 
cramped and confining. Compared, however, with what came before, its 
vision of women’s moral superiority was a radical step toward improv-
ing the status of women. Nineteenth century reformers such as Frances 
Willard, Josephine Butler and Jane Addams broadened the notion of 
woman’s sphere to include public reform efforts, to which Addams re-
ferred as “public housekeeping.”25 These reformers argued passionately 
for a single standard of sexual behavior:  
[N]umbers even of moral and religious people have permitted 
themselves to accept and condone in man what is fiercely con-
demned in woman. And do you see the logical necessity in this? 
It is that a large section of female society has to be told off—set 
aside, so to speak, to minister to the irregularities of the excus-
able man. That section is doomed to death, hurled to despair; 
while another section of womanhood is kept strictly and almost 
forcibly guarded in domestic purity. . . . [P]ublic opinion [must], 
 
1995). 
 18 SCHULHOFER, supra note 1, 1917 (1988). 
 19 Id. at 18. 
 20 Id. at 18–20. 
 21 Id. at at 18–19. 
 22 Vivian Berger, Man’s Trial, Woman’s Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1, 13–18 (Jan. 1977). 
 23 COVENTRY PATMORE, THE ANGEL IN THE HOUSE (1854). 
 24 John Ruskin, Of Queens’ Gardens, in SESAME AND LILIES (H. Bloom ed. 1983) (1910). 
 25 JANE ADDAMS, WOMEN AND PUBLIC HOUSEKEEPING (1910). In this view, virtually all of do-
mestic policy, in the sense of non-foreign policy, was in fact domestic, in the sense of women’s work. 
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both in theory and practice, . . . shall recognize the fundamental 
truth that the essence of right and wrong is in no way dependent 
upon sex, and shall demand of men precisely the same chastity 
as it demands of women. 26  
These thinkers were the first to see the link between sexual and eco-
nomic oppression. Women’s rights activists condemned wealthy men 
who regarded access to working women as a class privilege. The contin-
uum between the exploitation intrinsic to prostitution and the sexual 
exploitation of women outside sex work was widely noted and under-
stood as the result of an economic system that denied women access to 
economic opportunities.27 
A movement to reform sex law was an important part of the agenda 
of the first-wave women’s movement. The durability of the traditional 
doctrine of consent made the generally applicable law of rape impervi-
ous to these Victorian efforts: if consent could be contested at trial, pros-
ecution was seldom possible. Reformers therefore targeted a narrower 
set of cases, combining their larger narrative attacking sexual exploita-
tion with carefully crafted legal arguments applicable to particular con-
texts in which consent could be said to be wanting as a matter of law. 
A central achievement was the expansion of the law of statutory 
rape.28 Between 1885 and 1920, all US states raised the age of consent 
from between seven and twelve to between sixteen and eighteen.29 
Though situating this campaign in the context of larger moral issues, 
reformers repeatedly stressed a central inconsistency in the legal sys-
tem’s treatment of youth and incapacity. Boys and young men were pro-
tected until age twenty-one from an imprudent decision to enter even a 
trivial contract, while a girl over the age of ten who had even coerced 
 
 26 Butler, supra note 2, at 172-74. Jane Larson observed that these reformers “saw sexuality 
as a vehicle of power that in complex ways kept women subordinated in society. In response, they 
created a vigorous sexual politics that challenged not just private, but also public power. Ulti-
mately, they questioned the state’s conferral of privilege in law of male sexual interests to the 
detriment of women and girls; they thus exposed the state’s complicity in what otherwise appeared 
to be wholly private acts of sexual oppression.” Jane E. Larson, “Even a Worm Will Turn at Last”: 
Rape Reform in Late Nineteenth-Century America, 9 YALE L.J. & HUMAN. 1, 4 (1997). 
 27 Id. at 27; Reva B. Siegel, Introduction: A Short History of Sexual Harassment, in 
DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 12–13 (Catherine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., 
2004); Emma Goldman, The Traffic in Women, in ANARCHISM AND OTHER ESSAYS 177 (1910). 
 28 Suffrage is often seen as the first step in the emancipation of women when it was in fact as 
much the culmination of a broad variety of reform efforts undertaken by a women’s movement 
comprised of coalition of diverse views. Jane E. Larson, “Even a Worm Will Turn at Last”: Rape 
Reform in Late Nineteenth-Century America, 9 YALE J.L. & THE HUMAN. 1, 3 (1997) (“[F]eminism, 
evangelism, maternalism, domesticity, and moral reform . . . energized the mainstream of the 
woman movement.”). See also SHEILA JEFFREYS, THE SPINSTER AND HER ENEMIES: FEMINISM AND 
SEXUALITY 1880–1930 chs. 3–4 (London: Pandora, 1985). 
 29 ODEM, supra note 17, at 37. 
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sex was forced to bear life-altering consequences, such as pregnancy 
and unmarriagability, without legal protection.30 
A second and more complex set of legal protections consisted of civil 
and criminal actions for seduction. The early civil actions were compro-
mised by patriarchal attitudes, since only the victim’s male guardian 
had standing to sue, but over time both the defensibility and the efficacy 
of these laws increased as women obtained the right to represent them-
selves.31 Seduction theories were somewhat varied in their require-
ments, but many were dependent on the existence of misrepresentation. 
Thus, like statutory rape law, they could be defended as consistent with 
the rules governing non-sexual offenses. Relatively few doctrines spe-
cifically addressed the coercive nature of the workplace, but most in 
practice developed into a tool that protected young working women, and 
one interesting Missouri statute criminalized sexual relations between 
employers and young women employed in domestic service.32 Women’s 
rights groups pressed for the passage of criminal seduction laws,33 
which were widespread by the late nineteenth century, though later re-
pealed for supposedly exposing men to female exploitation.34 
The last cohort of first-wave feminists in the early twentieth cen-
tury placed more emphasis than their predecessors on sexual freedom, 
advocating a range of views from the mildly permissive35 to the radical 
support of free love.36 After the passage in 1920 of the Nineteenth 
Amendment, feminism entered a quiescent period, but public sexual 
norms gradually relaxed, in part because of improvements in the qual-
ity and availability of reliable contraception.37 A wide variety of think-
ers including academics like Alfred Kinsey38 and Wilhelm Reich,39 the 
 
 30 Larson, supra note 26, at 1, 8–10. 
 31 Brian Donovan, Gender Inequality and Criminal Seduction: Prosecuting Sexual Coercion in 
the Early-20th Century, 30 LAW AND SOC. INQUIRY 61, 66 (2005). See generally H. W. Humble, 
Seduction as a Crime, 21 COLUM. L. REV. 144 (1921); Jane E. Larson, “Women Understand so Little, 
They Call My Good Nature ‘Deceit’”: A Feminist Rethinking of Seduction, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 374 
(1993); Lea VanderVelde, The Legal Ways of Seduction, 48 STAN. L. REV. 817 (1996); Sara McLean, 
Confided to His Care or Protection: The Late Nineteenth-Century Crime of Workplace Sexual Har-
assment, 9 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 47 (1999). 
 32 Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1260 (1879). 
 33 Siegel, supra note 27, at 11–12. 
 34 D. R. N. Blackburn, Criminal Seduction, 31 CENT. L.J. 44, 44–50 (1890). 
 35 See, e.g., MARGARET SANGER, WOMEN AND THE NEW RACE 226, 229 (1920). 
 36 Emma Goldman, The Traffic in Women, in ANARCHISM AND OTHER ESSAYS (1910). 
 37 Latex was invented in 1916, greatly improving both the reliability and the experience of 
using barrier methods such a condoms and diaphragms. See Hallie Lieberman, A Short History of 
the Condom, JSTOR DAILY (June 8, 2017), https://daily.jstor.org/short-history-of-the-condom/ [http  
s://perma.cc/Q3CR-JJXP]. 
 38 ALFRED KINSEY, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE (1948); ALFRED KINSEY, SEXUAL 
BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN FEMALE (1953). 
 39 WILHELM REICH, THE SEXUAL REVOLUTION (1936). 
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writers of marriage manuals,40 and public figures like Hugh Hefner41 
and Helen Gurley Brown42 advocated increasingly permissive norms of 
sexual behavior. Like their Victorian-progressive predecessors, they en-
dorsed a sex-neutral standard. However, rather than extend the obliga-
tion of chastity to men, they hoped to provide women with the sexual 
freedoms traditionally reserved to males. Their perspective, now re-
ferred to as the sexual autonomy model, made fundamental the right of 
all individuals to decide for themselves with whom and under what cir-
cumstances to have sex. 
In the late 1950s, a new wave of sex law reformers began their 
work, this time based on the norm of sexual autonomy. The expansion 
of autonomy-based rights began with reforms in the law of rape43 and 
led to groundbreaking protections of women’s right to sexual pleasure, 
notably in cases Constitutionally protecting access to contraception and 
abortion.44 But the liberal alternative to religious sexual morality gave 
primacy to freedom of choice and provided no alternative narrative of 
sexual harm or voluntary restraint. In consequence, though women 
gained much needed freedom to engage in desired sex, far less progress 
was made in protecting them from undesired sex. Without such a nar-
rative, the scales were inevitably tipped against doctrines that could be 
seen as restricting the freedom to have sex. Some progress was made in 
the expansion of statutory status-based offenses that involved the 
abuse of positions of power.45 But the law of rape, with its focus on the 
victim’s behavior, proved hard to reform, and the sexual double stand-
ard continued to infect the application of even revised doctrine. 
The first sexual harassment cases were brought in the early 1970s 
and met a mixed reaction from courts. Virtually all involved the quid 
pro quo conduct of a supervisor who conditioned the terms of employ-
ment on the toleration of sexual advances, often quite degrading in na-
ture. Cases rejecting liability typically expressed the same concern for 
 
 40 See, e.g., THEODOOR HENDRIK VAN DE VELDE & MARGARET SMYTH, IDEAL MARRIAGE, ITS 
PHYSIOLOGY AND TECHNIQUE (1928). 
 41 See The Playboy Philosophy, Part I, Installments 1–7 (1962), https:// books.google.com/book 
s?id=akprmQEACAAJ&dq=playboy+philosophy&hl=e n&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjsnsGhlsjhAhVD 
XK0KHeoRARIQ6AEIKzAA [https://perma.cc/EZ5X-FYE4]. 
 42 See HELEN GURLEY BROWN, SEX AND THE SINGLE GIRL (1962). 
 43 Stephen J. Schulhofer, Taking Sexual Autonomy Seriously: Rape Law and Beyond, 11 LAW 
& PHIL. 35, 92–93 (1992). 
 44 Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 1342. 
 45 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 18.130.180(24) (1984) (prohibiting any licensed health profes-
sionals from engaging in “sexual contact with a client or patient”); Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6106.9 
(1993) (prohibiting sexual relationships between lawyers and clients under various circum-
stances); see also Cotton v. Kambly, 300 N.W.2d 627, 629 (Mich. App. 1981) (sexual relationship 
between psychiatrist and patient constitutes malpractice); McDaniel v. Gile, 230 Cal. App. 3d 363, 
376 (1991) (describing a lawyer’s threat to withhold legal services if client did not comply with 
sexual demand constitutes malpractice). 
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preserving male sexual opportunities that animated the worst aspects 
of rape law, and suggested that liability for even quite egregious behav-
ior would foreclose all sexual activity in the workplace.46 These courts 
seem to have concluded that the defendant caused no harm to the plain-
tiff beyond the inconvenience that sometimes attended normal hetero-
sexual interaction. This skepticism about the gravity of injury spilled 
over into unrelated elements of the cause of action: these cases found 
that plaintiffs had failed to prove not only the elements of harm but 
causation and agency liability. 
Those early courts that accepted sexual harassment as a ground of 
recovery appear to have done so from a different perspective on the cal-
culus of harm. They did not assess the sexual harm to women as more 
serious but rather saw the problem of economic discrimination as of 
greater importance. Their conception of injury evidently colored their 
analysis of the superficially unrelated requirements of causation and 
agency, which they were more likely to find satisfied.47 But even these 
courts imposed a requirement of tangible economic harm or at least the 
explicit threat of such harm. Abusive sexual behavior by supervisors 
without explicit threat or actual retaliation was without remedy. Sexual 
autonomy theory could, on a purely theoretical level and with some 
struggle, justify legal recognition of highly limited claims of sexual har-
assment, but it could not help judges see cases through the eyes of vic-
tims. Its sex-neutral picture of equal sexual agency focused primary on 
increasing freedom, leaving too many wondering why the work environ-
ment transformed sexual behavior that was acceptable in most spheres 
into a legal harm. 
 
 46 Tomkins v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553, 557 (D.N.J. 1976), rev’d, 568 F.2d 
1044 (3d Cir. 1977) (“If the plaintiff’s view were to prevail, no superior could, prudently, attempt 
to open a social dialogue with any subordinate of either sex. An invitation to dinner could become 
an invitation to a federal lawsuit if a once harmonious relationship turned sour at some later time. 
And if an inebriated approach by a supervisor to a subordinate at the office Christmas party could 
form the basis of a federal lawsuit for sex discrimination if a promotion or a raise is later denied 
to the subordinate, we would need 4,000 federal trial judges instead of some 400.”); Miller v. Bank 
of America, 418 F. Supp. 233, 236 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (“It is conceivable, under plaintiff’s theory, that 
flirtations of the smallest order would give rise to liability. The attraction of males to females and 
females to males is a natural sex phenomenon and it is probable that this attraction plays at least 
a subtle part in most personnel decisions. Such being the case, it would seem wise for the Courts 
to refrain from delving into these matters short of specific factual allegations describing an em-
ployer policy which in its application imposes or permits a consistent, as distinguished from iso-
lated, sex-based discrimination on a definable employee group”); Corne v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 
390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975) (“[A]n outgrowth of holding such activity to be actionable 
under Title VII would be a potential federal lawsuit every time any employee made amorous or 
sexually oriented advances toward another.”). 
 47 See Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 996 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (explaining that the Restatement 
imposes a narrow test for vicarious liability—“The tort must be one accomplished by an instru-
mentality, or through conduct associated with the agency status”); Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 
654, 656–61 (D.D.C. 1976). 
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The watershed change in the law of sexual harm began in 1975. In 
Against Our Will, Susan Brownmiller argued that men did not rape be-
cause they wanted sex, but rather used rape as a means to humiliate 
and subordinate women.48 Indeed, much or even all of what passed for 
consensual sex was in fact subtly disguised rape, a tool of oppression 
rather than an expression of desire. The new paradigm in rape law laid 
the ground work for Catherine MacKinnon to refocus the sexual har-
assment debate from formal equality to the power structures underly-
ing sex at work. Her 1979 landmark book, Sexual Harassment of Work-
ing Women, had been influential in draft form even before its 
publication. Her theory had two distinct components. The first con-
cerned the victim’s experience: the existence of the workplace power re-
lationship could make otherwise non-problematic sexual behavior coer-
cive.49 At the same time she began to advance the thesis that 
Brownmiller had developed in her work on criminal rape: Men did not 
seek sex and incidentally dominate women. They sought sex in order to 
dominate women.50 The inherently coercive nature of the workplace was 
simply a useful tool to effectuate the underlying goal of dominance. In 
her early work, MacKinnon focused more or less equally on the har-
asser’s impulse to subordinate and the role of the coercive environment 
in the experience of the powerless. In her later work, her focus shifted 
to the desire to dominate, and the institutional setting became unim-
portant: 
The uncoerced context for sexual expression becomes as elusive 
as the physical acts [of sexuality and violence] come to feel in-
distinguishable. . . . [R]ape is defined as distinct from inter-
course, while for women it is difficult to distinguish the two un-
der conditions of male dominance.51 
From this perspective, the coercive nature of the workplace was al-
most irrelevant, since harm resulted from the fact that men’s motives 
were so pernicious and their power so omnipresent. 
Some feminist writers on sexual harassment accepted only ele-
ments of the dominance model, notably the view that sexual harm is 
motivated by misogyny. However, the greatest influence on the public 
narrative came from MacKinnon and her sometime co-author Andrea 
 
 48 SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 377–78 (1975). 
 49 “Sexual harassment, most broadly defined, refers to the unwanted imposition of sexual re-
quirements in the context of a relationship of unequal power. Central to the concept is the use of 
power derived from one sphere to lever benefits or impose deprivations in another.” CATHERINE 
MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 1 (1979). 
 50 BROWNMILLER, supra note 46. 
 51 CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 174, 175 (1989). 
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Dworkin. MacKinnon and Dworkin did not stop simply at the observa-
tion that sexual harm can be the result of a defendant’s urge to oppress, 
but argued instead that it must be the source of all sexual harm. More-
over, the desire to subordinate was inevitably a generalized desire to 
degrade and humiliate all women and such motives were pervasive in 
heterosexual relationships.52 I will call the view that both of these hy-
potheses are true the strong misogyny narrative of sexual harm. 
Dominance theories captured a fundamental truth: sexual harm 
can result from sexual advances motivated not by erotic desire but by 
dominance and misogyny. The dominance model received widespread 
and generally respectful public attention. The idea that dominance ra-
ther than desire motivated sexual advances in the workplace was 
quickly accepted by observers across the political spectrum.53 It thus 
supplied the secular theory of harm that sexual autonomy models had 
failed to provide. This new narrative provided public discussion with a 
powerful way of rethinking sexual misconduct that was acceptable even 
to those who did wholly abandon the double standard. The double 
standard absolved men from any responsibility to control their sexual 
impulses—that task was left to women, who were assigned the unap-
pealing role of sex police. But every society expects men as well as 
women to control their violent impulses, and if rape was a crime of vio-
lence its perpetrator had breached the most central of societal norms. 
Similarly, society expects its members to keep their nonviolent but ag-
gressive impulses in check, so that sexual behavior short of rape is more 
easily seen as misconduct if motivated by hostility rather than erotic 
passion. 
The focus on motive also placed the issue of consent in a new light. 
Men might argue that women desired (and consented to) sex more often 
than they would admit, but few were willing to claim publicly that 
women desired victimization. If sexual harms were the result of misog-
yny, the questions of consent and unwelcomeness receded in im-
portance, since the wrong inhered in the accused’s intent rather than 
the victim’s failure to resist. By persuading the public that at least some 
rape cases were motivated by hatred rather than lust, the dominance 
thesis paved the way for crucial rape law reforms like victim shield stat-
utes. Similarly, a focus on animus in workplace harassment blunted the 
impulse to ask whether the victim had encouraged the behavior at is-
sue. 
 
 52 MACKINNON, supra note 49, at 1; ANDREA DWORKIN, INTERCOURSE (1987). 
 53 Louise Thistle, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: A Struggle for Dominance, SAN DIEGO 
UNION, Apr. 20, 1980, at 58; Karen Kirk, Fighting Abuse at Work, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Oct. 10, 
1980, at 46. 
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The dominance theory in general and MacKinnon’s work in partic-
ular received widespread and generally supportive coverage in the pop-
ular press. At the same time, even sympathetic observers seldom ac-
cepted MacKinnon’s general view of relations between men and 
women.54 In the words of one, “what McKinnon represents is the em-
battled, bleak, martyred side of feminism . . . [H]er view is so narrow 
and her attitude so wound-licking that we tend to get awfully weary of 
her version of “unmodified feminism” early on.”55 Her dark picture of 
sex between men and women was often criticized as a step backwards 
for women’s efforts to achieve sexual pleasure on the same terms as 
men.56 Public opinion thus accepted a circumscribed version of domi-
nance theory, which was understood to describe the conduct and mo-
tives of a subset of men, and this picture was helicopter dropped into 
the otherwise prevailing model of sexual autonomy. The next section 
examines how this ambivalent acceptance of the misogyny model played 
out in the case law. 
II. SUPERVISORS, COERCION AND HOSTILITY: THE WRONG TURN 
The idea that sexual misconduct is about power rather than sex is 
compelling and easily understood, and it is now a commonplace of public 
discussion. This simple thesis did nothing short of revolutionize sex law. 
But its simplicity obscured several very real complexities, such as the 
possibility of harm without misogyny and the relevance of coercion to 
alternative conceptions of harm. To further complicate matters, few ac-
ademics, much less the courts and the public, accept the strong misog-
yny model in its entirety, and the sexual autonomy model remains im-
portant. Examining the evolution of the core doctrines of sexual 
harassment reveals how the new narrative developed an awkward com-
bination of autonomy and misogyny principles. The resulting hybrid mi-
sogyny model recognized sexual harassment in theory while providing 
little relief in practice. 
By the end of the 1970s, courts had come to accept as a form of sex 
discrimination the explicit conditioning of job benefits on toleration of 
sexual conduct. Title VII’s prohibition of this scenario was put on a 
sound doctrinal footing by Barnes v. Costle,57 which stressed the critical 
 
 54 Patricia Holt, MacKinnon’s Feminist View: Embattled and Unmodified, SAN FRANCISCO 
CHRONICLE, July 2, 1987, at 70. 
 55 Id. 
 56 See, e.g., Jerry Barnett, Is Anti-Sex Feminism a Step Backwards for Women’s Rights?, FW- 
SA BLOG (Dec. 6, 2013), http://fwsablog.org.uk/2013/12/06/is-anti-sex-feminism-a-step-backwards-
for-womens-rights/ [https://perma.cc/DSA9-MGYG]. 
 57 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
299] SEXUAL HARMS WITHOUT MISOGYNY 313 
role of but-for causation. Discrimination occurred because the plaintiff 
would not have suffered the disadvantageous outcome but for her sex.58 
After Barnes, the next critical question was the proper treatment 
of cases without an explicit quid pro quo that caused tangible economic 
injury. In Sexual Harassment of Working Women, MacKinnon had pro-
posed a model of non-quid pro quo cases59 which she later called envi-
ronmental harassment and described as “sexual insult and aggres-
sion.”60 MacKinnon did not entirely ignore the issue of coercion in 
environmental discrimination, but she identified as the coercive ele-
ment not the supervisory relationship, but women’s generally poor la-
bor market prospects.61 In 1980,62 the EEOC issued Guidelines that fol-
lowed MacKinnon’s distinction, defining sexual harassment as 
unwelcome sexual conduct that either contained a quid pro quo, 
whether implicit or explicit,63 or that had “the purpose or effect of un-
reasonably interfering with an individual’s work performance or creat-
ing an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.”64 
A number of lower courts soon adopted hostile-environment theory, 
and the Supreme Court endorsed it in the 1986 case Meritor Savings 
Bank v. Vinson,65 in which the plaintiff’s legal team included MacKin-
non.66 The plaintiff, Mechelle Vinson, testified that she had been intim-
idated into a sexual relationship with her supervisor, Sidney Taylor, 
that had included rape. However, there had been no concrete retaliation 
or explicit threat of such,67 and the defendant argued that lack of eco-
nomic injury precluded liability. 
 
 58 Id. at 990. The critical role of but-for causation has since been reaffirmed by the Supreme 
Court in Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002. 
 59 MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN, supra note 49, at Ch. 3–4. 
 60 Brief of Respondent, at 30, Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986), 1986 
U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 102. 
 61 MACKINNON, supra note 49, at 40–41. 
 62 Intent to Conduct Public Scoping Meeting in Compliance with the National Environmental 
Policy Act, 45 Fed. Reg. 74, 676 (1980). 
 63 “Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of section 703 of title VII.Unwelcome sexual 
advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature con-
stitute sexual harassment when (1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implic-
itly a term or condition of an individual’s employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such con-
duct by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual . . . 
.” 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1980). 
 64 Id. 
 65 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
 66 Brief of Respondent, supra note 60, at 1. 
 67 In particular, Vinson claimed that shortly after she was hired, Taylor: 
invited her out to dinner and, during the course of the meal, suggested that they go to a 
motel to have sexual relations. At first she refused, but out of what she described as fear 
of losing her job she eventually agreed. According to respondent, Taylor thereafter made 
repeated demands upon her for sexual favors, usually at the branch, both during and 
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The central holding of Meritor is that discrimination with respect 
to the terms and privileges of employment includes not only “tangible 
loss” of “economic character,” but also “psychological aspects of work-
place environment.” The Court’s opinion, however, goes further than 
this by following the plaintiff’s brief, adopting the misogyny model’s em-
phasis on motive, and changing the narrative of workplace sex. Where 
unsympathetic courts had seen sex, the Meritor Court saw sexual 
abuse: “Surely, a requirement that a man or woman run a gauntlet of 
sexual abuse in return for the privilege of being allowed to work and 
make a living can be as demeaning and disconcerting as the harshest of 
racial epithets.”68 If defendants were motivated by the desire to abuse 
rather than the desire for sex, their needs no longer deserved weight in 
the social calculus, and thus the scope of liability could be enlarged. 
Meritor and subsequent cases reflected the emerging understand-
ing that sexual advances can be sex discrimination, but they did so by 
a route that embodies several troublesome premises. First, they sug-
gested that an abusive motive is a key element of the cause of action, in 
stark contrast to non-sexual Title VII doctrine, in which only but-for 
causation rather than hostility is required. Second, the animus-based 
theory of harm seriously deprecates the importance, from the em-
ployee’s perspective, of supervisory authority. Quid pro quo doctrine is 
based on the significance of the power relationship, and the Meritor 
Court might have chosen to expand existing quid pro quo doctrine, as 
the EEOC Guidelines suggested, to acknowledge the implicitly coercive 
nature of any supervisory relationship.69 Vinson testified that she re-
luctantly acquiesced to Taylor’s demands and did not report him for fear 
of losing her job: had Taylor been a coworker instead of a supervisor, 
Vinson would have been far more likely to resist. Instead the Court 
chose to apply hostile environment doctrine, which focuses not on the 
context but on “hostile” motivation of the harasser. 
The Court solidified the doctrinal emphasis on the defendant’s mo-
tivation in Harris v. Forklift, which held that to be actionable under 
 
after business hours; she estimated that over the next several years she had intercourse 
with him some 40 or 50 times. In addition, respondent testified that Taylor fondled her 
in front of other employees, followed her into the women’s restroom when she went there 
alone, exposed himself to her, and even forcibly raped her on several occasions. These 
activities ceased after 1977, respondent stated, when she started going with a steady 
boyfriend. 
Vinson, 477 U.S. at 60. 
 68 Id. at 67 (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982)). 
 69 For criticism of this approach see Lynn T. Dickinson, Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment: A 
New Standard, 2 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 107 (1995); Marlissa Vinciguerra, Note, The After-
math of Meritor: A Search for Standards in the Law of Sexual Harassment, 98 YALE L.J. 1717, 
1718–19 (1989). 
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hostile environment theory, an environment must be one “that a rea-
sonable person would find hostile or abusive.”70 The court imposed a 
totality of the circumstances test whose four factors made no reference, 
direct or indirect, to the existence of supervisory authority.71 Hostile 
work environment theory thus applied in an identical fashion to the be-
havior of coworker and supervisors, and the special role of the supervi-
sory relationship was limited to cases of explicit quid pro quo. This was 
a striking shift, since even earlier courts that rejected liability were re-
markably candid in noting the coercive nature of the supervisory rela-
tionship.72 
This sole focus on the motives of the harasser, to the exclusion of 
circumstantial factors creating coercion, might have had done little 
harm to future plaintiffs had the Court accepted the strong misogyny 
model’s view that malign motives were pervasive. But the Court, like 
most Americans, rejected this view and repeatedly indicated that it did 
not intend to provide recovery for all sexualized behavior73 or even some 
mildly offensive behavior.74 In effect the Court adopted a sexual auton-
omy model that permitted adults to engage in sexually tinged conduct 
as long as that behavior was kept within an acceptable range. 
This doctrinal narrative, which probably tracked public sentiment 
as well, might thus be called a hybrid misogyny model. It took one key 
principle from the strong misogyny narrative: all sexual harm resulted 
from the desire to degrade and exert power over all women. At the same 
time, it assumed that respect was the norm in sexual relations between 
men and women. Thus, the judicial narrative distinguished two types 
of men. Good men, the majority, conformed to the norms of the sexual 
autonomy model and its consent-based morality. Only a relatively small 
 
 70 Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 21–22 (1993). 
 71 1) the frequency of the discriminatory conduct, 2) its severity, 3) whether it is physically 
threatening or humiliating or a mere offensive utterance; and 4) whether it unreasonably inter-
feres with an employee’s work performance. Harris, 510 U.S. at 23. 
 72 “The abuse of authority by supervisors of either sex for personal purposes is an unhappy 
and recurrent feature of our social experience . . . . [P]laintiff’s theory rests on the proposition, with 
which this Court concurs, that the power inherent in a position of authority is necessarily coer-
cive. . . . Any subordinate knows that the boss is the boss whether a file folder or a dinner is at 
issue . . . . If the plaintiff’s view were to prevail . . . . An invitation to dinner could become an invi-
tation to a federal lawsuit if a once harmonious relationship turned sour at some later time.” Tom-
kins, 422 F. Supp. at 557. 
 73 Harassment does not include “ordinary socializing in the workplace—such as male-on-male 
horseplay or intersexual flirtation.” Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1003. 
 74 “This standard . . . takes a middle path between making actionable any conduct that is 
merely offensive and requiring the conduct to cause a tangible psychological injury. As we pointed 
out in Meritor, “mere utterance of an . . . epithet which engenders offensive feelings in an em-
ployee,” ibid . . . does not sufficiently affect the conditions of employment to implicate Title VII. 
Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work 
environment—an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive—is beyond 
Title VII’s purview.” Harris, 510 U.S. at 21. 
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group of bad men were motivated by animosity towards women, and it 
was this group only with whom the law was concerned. The malign mo-
tives of these bad actors were the source of sexual harm, without regard 
to contextual factors creating coercion. 
The problems of the hybrid model can be seen when the current 
standard is applied to specific facts. In Baskerville v. Culligan Int’l 
Co.,75 the plaintiff, Valerie Baskerville, had been subjected to a constant 
stream of sexual speech and indications of sexual interest by her super-
visor, Michael Hall.76 For example, at one point, he told her that “his 
wife had told him he had ‘better clean up my act’ and ‘better think of 
you as Ms. Anita Hill.’”77 On another occasion, the announcement “May 
I have your attention, please” was broadcast over the public address 
system. Hall stopped at Baskerville’s desk and said, “You know what 
that means, don’t you? All pretty girls run around naked.”78 
The Seventh Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Posner, took the unu-
sual step of overturning a jury verdict for plaintiff.79 It reasoned that 
the defendant was “not a sexual harasser” but merely “not a man of 
refinement” and “a man whose sense of humor took final shape in ado-
lescence.”80 Moreover, Posner stated, “[t]he comment about Anita Hill 
was the opposite of solicitation, the implication being that he would get 
into trouble if he didn’t keep his distance.”81 Noting that context might 
change the effect of the remarks, the opinion nonetheless concludes 
“there is no suggestion of any other contextual feature of their conver-
sations that might make [the defendant] a harasser.”82 Commenting 
that Hall “never said anything to her that could not be repeated on 
primetime television,”83 Posner concluded, “only a woman of Victorian 
delicacy—a woman mysteriously aloof from contemporary American 
popular culture in all its sex-saturated vulgarity—would find [the de-
fendant’s] patter substantially . . . distressing.”84 
In some sense, Posner was correct. The defendant was not clearly 
a misogynist and quite possibly simply an immature and silly man. But 
this fact does not deserve the importance he gives it unless existing hos-
tile environment doctrine adds to Title VII a requirement of animus 
 
 75 50 F.3d 428 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 76 Id. at 430. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. at 431. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. 
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that has been rejected in other contexts.85 What should have been crit-
ical was whether the conduct would not have been directed to her but-
for her sex (and it clearly would not have been) and whether she suf-
fered harm sufficient to trigger Title VII. The latter question can only 
be answered the context of the fact that Hall was Baskerville’s supervi-
sor and that the comments were explicitly directed to her—she was not 
watching a TV show. Most women, I will venture, find the behavior of 
Michael Scott in The Office hilarious rather than offensive, in part be-
cause the show mocks rather than condones his behavior.86 The same 
behavior by an actual supervisor would provoke a very different reac-
tion. Hall in effect told Baskerville that he might have propositioned 
her had it not been for his wife’s warning, a comment that would have 
been unsettling even in a social setting and was downright scary coming 
from a supervisor. Posner argued that Hall’s implication that he would 
not harass Baskerville eliminated any sexual threat from the situation. 
How far would Posner take this reasoning: would he be similarly dis-
missive of the statement “I’ve fantasized about forcing myself on you, 
but don’t worry, I won’t”? The opinion is all the more remarkable be-
cause Posner has elsewhere shown great insight into the humiliating 
nature of similar interactions.87 
Baskerville illustrates the pitfalls of emphasizing motive but might 
be dismissed as a singular opinion. The next Section considers three 
areas in which the problem of the strong misogyny theory have or are 
threatening to create broader doctrinal problems. 
III. THREE DOCTRINAL PROBLEMS 
A. Agency Liability 
The Supreme Court missed another opportunity to draw a bright 
line between supervisor and coworker harassment when it considered 
the rules governing employer liability. Greater liability for supervisor 
than coworker conduct would not have erased the problems caused by 
Meritor, but it would have focused employer attention on the main prob-
lem. Instead, the court chose blur further the boundaries between su-
pervisory and coworker conduct in the twin 1998 cases of Burlington 
 
 85 Rebecca Hanner White & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Whose Motive Matters?: Discrimination 
in Multi-Actor Employment Decision Making, 61 LA. L. REV. 495, 501 (2001) (“For years, it has (or 
should have) been clear that discriminatory intent or motive is not coextensive with hostile ani-
mus”). 
 86 My personal favorite is the Sexual Harassment episode. The Office US: Sexual Harassment 
(NBC television broadcast Sept. 27, 2005), part of which can be seen at, Michael Scott Fights Cor-
porate – The Office US, YOUTUBE (Jan. 30, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DX5G47mh 
M28 [https://perma.cc/8RHA-HLGL]. 
 87 See generally Baskerville, 50 F.3d 428. 
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Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth88 (Kennedy) and Faragher v. City of Boca Ra-
ton89 (Souter). 
Justice Kennedy’s Burlington opinion began well, rejecting the use 
of the categories quid pro quo and hostile work environment in deter-
mining vicarious liability, holding that courts should instead look to 
agency law and the purpose of Title VII.90 Agency law, as summarized 
in the Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219, provides strict employer 
liability for the acts of employees “committed while acting in the scope 
of their employment.”91 Although the question was somewhat closer 
than the opinion suggested,92 the Court was not clearly wrong in hold-
ing that sexual harassment by a supervisor was not conduct within the 
scope of employment. 
The opinion then examined the distinction between coworker and 
supervisor conduct under the Restatement’s provision for liability when 
the employee “was aided in accomplishing” the wrongdoing by the ex-
istence of agency relation, even where the acts were outside the scope 
of employment.93 The opinion noted that a generous interpretation of 
this rule would imply strict liability for all coworker harassment and 
declined to adopt this view, noting that neither the EEOC nor other 
courts had advocated this approach.94 The Court acknowledged that su-
pervisors who take tangible employment actions are more clearly aided 
by the agency relationship than are coworkers: “a supervisor’s power 
and authority invests his or her harassing conduct with a particular 
threatening character.”95 The Court declined, however, to find that all 
harassing supervisors were “aided” by the supervisory relationship on 
the grounds that “there are acts of harassment a supervisor might com-
mit which might be the same acts a coemployee would commit, and 
there may be some circumstances where the supervisor’s status makes 
little difference.”96 
 
 88 524 U.S. 742 (1998). 
 89 524 U.S. 775 (1998). 
 90 Burlington, 524 U.S. at 751–53. 
 91 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1). 
 92 The Restatement is not entirely consistent in its definition of scope of employment, at one 
point appearing to require that action be motivated in part by a desire to serve the master (§ 228) 
and at another simply that it be authorized or incidental to authorized conduct (§ 229). Id. §§ 228–
29. Some employers seemed to regard sexual access to subordinates as a perquisite of status. JULIE 
BEREBITSKY, SEX AND THE OFFICE: A HISTORY OF GENDER, POWER, AND DESIRE 144 (2012). At such 
employers, harassment might be said to be authorized. 
 93 Burlington, 524 U.S. at 758–59. 
 94 Id. at 760. 
 95 Id. at 763. 
 96 Id. 
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The Court concluded that agency law was insufficiently clear to 
provide a rule governing the proper scope of employer liability, and in-
stead looked to the policies underlying Title VII.97 It stated that the 
central such policy was conciliation and the avoidance of lawsuits,98 and 
therefore imposed a kind of negligence standard in cases in which a su-
pervisor had not taken tangible job action.99 Employers would not be 
liable if (i) they exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct 
promptly any sexually harassing behavior and (ii) the plaintiff-em-
ployee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive mecha-
nisms the employer provided.100 
These agency rules have proven nothing short of catastrophic for 
sexual harassment victims. Survey evidence shows that victims believe 
that their reports will be at best ignored and will more likely subject 
them to retaliation.101 One study found that more than 75% of complain-
ants encountered retaliation.102 Victims are caught in a double bind. 
Even short delays in reporting will be found unreasonable, providing 
the employer with a complete defense.103 However, employees forfeit Ti-
tle VII’s provisions against retaliation if they make complaints of sexual 
 
 97 Id. at 763–64. 
 98 “For example, Title VII is designed to encourage the creation of antiharassment [sic] policies 
and effective grievance mechanisms. Were employer liability to depend in part on an employer’s 
effort to create such procedures, it would effect [sic] Congress’ intention to promote conciliation 
rather than litigation in the Title VII context.” Id. at 764. 
 99 Id. at 765. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Louise F. Fitzgerald, Suzanne Swan & Karla Fischer, Why Didn’t She Just Report Him? 
The Psychological and Legal Implications of Women’s Responses to Sexual Harassment, 51 J. SOC. 
ISSUES 117, 127 (1995) (60% of non-reporters believed they would be blamed for the incident if 
they made a formal complaint; 60% believed complaints would be ineffective because nothing 
would be done); Chelsea R. Willness, Piers Steel & Kibeom Lee, A Meta-Analysis of the Antecedents 
and Consequences of Workplace Sexual Harassment, 60 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 127 (2007); David 
Sherwyn, Michael Heise & Zev J. Eigen, Don’t Train Your Employees and Cancel Your “1-800” 
Harassment Hotline: An Empirical Examination and Correction of the Flaws in the Affirmative 
Defense to Sexual Harassment Charges, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1265, 1290–92 (2001). 
 102 Lilia M. Cortina & Vicki J. Magley, Raising Voice, Risking Retaliation: Events Following 
Interpersonal Mistreatment in the Workplace, 8:4 J. OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH PSYCHOL. 247, 255 
(2003). 
 103 See Jackson v. Arkansas Dep’t of Educ., Vocational & Technical Div., 272 F.3d 1020, 1026 
(8th Cir. 2001) (finding nine-month delay in reporting sexual harassment to be unreasonable); 
Shaba v. IntraAction Corp., No. 02 C 5173, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78, at *16 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 5, 2004) 
(finding two-month delay in reporting sexually harassing conduct of supervisor—during which 
time employee recorded events in a log and talked to coworkers about the harassment—to be un-
reasonable); Dedner v. Oklahoma, 42 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1260 (E.D. Okla. 1999) (finding three-
month delay in reporting sexual harassment by supervisor, who had previously been fired for sex-
ually harassing behavior and then reinstated, to be unreasonable); Phillips v. Taco Bell Corp., 83 
F. Supp. 2d 1029 (E.D. Mo. 2000) (holding that plaintiff’s delay in reporting for three months after 
the first incident made her behavior unreasonable, even though she reported once behavior esca-
lated); Kohler v. Inter-Tel Tech., No. C98-0378, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5425, at *15–16 (N.D. Cal. 
Apr. 13, 1999) (finding that employees who do not report are almost always found to have acted 
unreasonably). 
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harassment before the conduct rises to a level at which it becomes ac-
tionable.104 Courts have insisted on prompt reporting of incidents even 
when the employer has actual notice of egregious public conduct prior 
to formal reporting.105 Although courts typically impose stringent time-
liness requirements on plaintiffs, they are tolerant of significant delays 
in response by defendants.106 Courts generally reject employee claims 
that they failed to report because of concerns about futility or retalia-
tion,107 even when these concerns can be substantiated108 or even when 
a direct threat has been made. 109 
The Burlington/Faragher rule thus places a burden on sexual har-
assment plaintiffs utterly unlike any other in Title VII jurisprudence. 
Title VII’s policy of conciliation is, as a general matter, implemented by 
requiring plaintiffs to file a complaint with the EEOC and to attempt to 
reach an administrative settlement before going to court. Burling-
ton/Faragher inexplicably adds a new layer to this process, one which 
is extremely prejudicial to victims. The employer-procedures defense 
encourages employers to devise a reporting system that satisfies the 
courts but discourages complaints.110 It is hard to think of any other 
area of law in which potential plaintiffs are required to report their con-
cerns and lay out their entire case to a potentially adverse party without 
the benefit of a neutral intermediary. 
At the time of Burlington/Faragher, the Court was far from un-
sympathetic to sexual harassment complainants. How could it have cre-
ated such a mess? The misogyny narrative encouraged it to view har-
assment as an offense of moral turpitude, approaching rape in its 
seriousness. Had the Court taken this further, adopting a strong misog-
yny perspective, it would have regarded harassment as part of a larger 
 
 104 Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 270–71 (2001) (per curiam). 
 105 Conatzer v. Med. Prof’l. Bldg. Serv., Inc., 255 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1264–71 (N.D. Okla. 2003) 
(Plaintiff’s supervisor rubbed against the side of plaintiff’s chest on Sept. 28 and then placed her 
head in a headlock between his knees on October 11 or 12. On October 15, the plaintiff made a 
formal complaint under the employer’s sexual harassment policy. Even though the first incident 
occurred in front of another supervisor, the district court held that the employer’s failure to take 
any action until after the plaintiff made a formal complaint to be reasonable, because that single 
incident did not give the employer notice of the existence of a hostile environment requiring cor-
rection. However, the district court concluded that plaintiff’s failure to make a formal report im-
mediately after that incident, despite a formal incident 3–4 days after the second incident, consti-
tuted an unreasonable failure to take advantage of preventative or corrective opportunities 
provided by the employer). 
 106 Anderson v. Leigh, No. 98 C 50169, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1584, at *17–19 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 
10, 2000). 
 107 Id. at *3–4, *22. 
 108 Childress v. PetsMart, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 705, 707–09 (W.D. Tex. 2000). 
 109 Sconce v. Tandy Corp., 9 F. Supp. 2d 773, 775–76 (W.D. Ky 1998). 
 110 See Sherwyn, supra note 101. 
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system of pervasive oppression, and would never have entrusted em-
ployers and their agents with the job of protecting women from harass-
ment. But the Court, like the public, rejected the strong dominance the-
ory in favor of a dichotomized picture of a few bad apples in a barrel of 
good actors. This hybrid view provided no way of thinking about the 
complex problems that result not from misogyny but from the combina-
tion of power imbalance and economic self-interest. Sexual harassment 
persists because of the misconduct of a few but just as much from the 
inaction of others. Supervisors are almost by definition more valued by 
an organization than those they supervise. An employer may fail to act 
against a supervisor not because it condones his actions but simply be-
cause intervention is more costly than looking the other way. 
B. Disappointed Affections 
Genuine and lasting love can arise at work.111 Public opinion seems 
solidly supportive of office romance: one survey found that only 4% be-
lieve that work relationships are wrong under all circumstances.112 In-
deed, between a third and a half of respondents report having had sex-
ual or romantic involvement at work.113 Yet surveys also suggest that 
attraction and relationships between supervisor and subordinate can 
 
 111 Good data on sex and love at work is surprisingly hard to find. Most surveys that directly 
examine the topic appear to be done by commercial vendors of human resource related services 
such as Vault and CareerBuilder. The sample sizes are typically under 1000, which is problematic 
for phenomena that might well vary widely among sectors and regions. Academic studies on larger 
samples that consider adjacent topics, such as marital happiness, sometimes shed light on office 
relationships. Taken together, this body of research, however incomplete, does seem to provide 
relatively consistent results, at least as to the order of magnitude of various phenomenon. One 
survey found that 31 percent of workers who started dating at work eventually married. This sur-
vey was conducted online by The Harris Poll from November 28 and December 20, 2017 and in-
cluded a representative sample of 809 full-time workers across industries and company sizes in 
the U.S. private sector. Rachel Nauen, Office Romance Hits 10-Year Low, According to Career Buil- 
der’s Annual Valentine’s Day Survey, CAREERBUILDER (Feb. 1, 2018), http://press.careerbuilder.co 
m/2018-02-01-Office-Romance-Hits-10-Year-Low-According-to-CareerBuilders-Annual-Valentine 
s-Day-Survey [https://perma.cc/7AK8-9R4P]. A representative sample of 19,131 individuals mar-
ried between 2005 and 2012 found that 65.05% of relationships began offline and of those 21.66% 
began at work, implying that about 14% began at work. John T. Cacioppo et al., Marital Satisfac-
tion and Break-ups Differ across On-line and Off-line Meeting Venues, 110 PROCS. NAT’L ACAD. 
SCI. U.S. (PNAS) 10135 (June 18, 2013). The marital satisfaction level of work relationships was 
somewhat lower at a significant level, though to my eye the effect size does not seem particularly 
large. Id. at 101373. 
 112 The 2018 Vault Office Romance Survey Results, VAULT CAREERS (Feb. 12, 2018), http://www 
.vault.com/blog/workplace-issues/2018-vault-office-romance-survey-results/ [https://perma.cc/E44 
D-Z42Q]. 
 113 CareerBuilder surveys find over the years that between 36 and 41% of workers have ever 
dated a co-worker. Nauen, supra note 103. The Vault 2018 survey found 52% had participated in 
an office romance. Id. 
322 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [2019 
be problematic even when genuinely motivated by affection. These re-
lationships account for just under 10% of office relationships,114 are dis-
proportionately dangerous,115 probably account for most of the 6% of 
workers who have left a job because a romantic relationship with some-
one at work went sour, and hurt women more than men.116 Public opin-
ion is less approving of relationships between co-workers and subordi-
nates, though only a minority (43%) feel that relationships between 
supervisors and subordinates are never appropriate.117 These relation-
ships are not uncommon: 22% of workers have dated someone who was 
their supervisor at the time.118 
The perils of romance in the supervisory setting are attested by the 
significant number of sexual harassment cases involving a defendant 
whose feelings about the plaintiff seem, on any reasonable interpreta-
tion, to have been sincere and respectful romantic interest. In some 
cases, the plaintiff had initially engaged in a consensual affair. In oth-
ers the defendant’s interest in the plaintiff was never reciprocated. In 
either situation, the plaintiff eventually rejected the defendant. At that 
point, the defendant began to engage in workplace behavior that was 
harmful to the plaintiff. Sometimes the behavior in these cases is 
merely wounded— such as avoidance of direct contact that led to less 
favorable work assignments.119 In other cases the behavior was more 
antagonistic but would not in itself have risen to the threshold needed 
for a hostile environment claim. 
The adverse consequences of romantic rejection are illustrated by 
Novak v. Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor.120 The plaintiff, Shanti 
Novak, was a detective with the Waterfront Commission of N.Y. Har-
bor.121 She became romantically involved with Scott Politano at a time 
when both held the same rank, in different locations. Eventually the 
 
 114 Dana Wilkie, Forbidden Love: Workplace-Romance Policies Now Stricter, SHRM (Sept. 24, 
2013), https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/hr-topics/employee-relations/pages/forbidden-love 
-workplace-romance-policies-stricter.aspx [https://perma.cc/4ACE-MFQC]. 
 115 James Lardner, et al., Cupid’s Cubicles: Office Romance Is Alive and Well, Despite a Barrage 
of Corporate Countermeasures, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 14, 1998, at 44, 47. 
 116 9% of women have left work because of failed romance compared to 3% of men. The 2018 
Vault Office Romance Survey Results, supra note 112. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Nauen, supra note 103 (finding that 27% of women reporting they have dated at work say 
they have dated their supervisor compared with 16% of men. The survey suggests that an addi-
tional 8% have been higher ranking people not their supervisor. 30% total—35% of women and 
25% of men—have dated someone at a higher level in the organization). 
 119 Novak v. Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor, 928 F. Supp. 2d 723, 731 (S.D.N.Y 2013). 
 120 Id. at 726. 
 121 Id. 
299] SEXUAL HARMS WITHOUT MISOGYNY 323 
two became live-in partners,122 and during this time, Politano was pro-
moted to Lieutenant and was transferred to Novak’s office, conse-
quently becoming her supervisor.123 Novak terminated her relationship 
with Politano shortly thereafter.124 After her breakup with Politano, 
Novak was singled out for unfavorable treatment even after Politano 
was replaced as Novak’s supervisor.125 Novak was given unfavorable 
work and shift assignments; was subjected to heightened scrutiny with 
respect to her work and her requests for overtime pay and sick leave; 
was the only detective not to receive further formal detective training; 
was excluded from an email regarding a shooting range schedule; and 
was the only detective to whom newly hired detectives were not as-
signed, which was both humiliating and deprived her of the opportunity 
to learn from the new assignees, who were seasoned detectives from 
other agencies.126 The situation became worse after she complained to 
the human resources department.127 Politano refused to communicate 
with Novak and gave her orders only indirectly through detectives jun-
ior to her, and escalated minor work failings into formal written mem-
oranda of counseling.128 Without questioning that Novak was mis-
treated by Politano or that Politano’s attitude affected the way other 
supervisors treated Novak, the court concluded that “such mistreat-
ment, while unfair and unfortunate, does not constitute Title VII sex 
discrimination under existing law.”129 
Faced with similar cases, other courts likewise typically reject lia-
bility in these cases, reasoning that thwarted affection rather than gen-
eralized animus towards women motivated the defendant.130 Yet Title 
VII does not contain any requirement that plaintiff prove animus, but 
rests liability on a showing that the defendants acted “because of 
sex.”131 In principle, the Supreme Court has applied this principle to 
 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. at 726–27. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Id. at 727. 
 129 Id. at 731. The case seems somewhat confused about the elements of a hostile environment 
claim: “At no point during the relevant period was Novak terminated or suspended, nor did she 
suffer a loss of pay or other compensation, such as sick time or vacation time. Novak was never 
demoted or denied an opportunity for promotion, and she was never formally disciplined during 
her employment at the Commission.” Id. at 727. 
 130 Keppler v. Hinsdale Township High Sch. Dist., 715 F. Supp. 862, 871–72 (N.D. Ill. 1989); 
see generally Huebschen v. Dep’t of Health and Social Servs., 716 F.2d 1167 (7th Cir. 1983) (Equal 
Protection clause applied to public employer). To be fair, the Keppler court acknowledged that an 
explicit quid pro quo (“resume sleeping with me or else”) could violate Title VII, but held that even 
egregious retaliation based on hurt feelings could not. Keppler, 715 F. Supp. at 870 n.7. 
 131 Cary Franklin, Discriminatory Animus, in A NATION OF WIDENING OPPORTUNITIES? THE 
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sexual harassment doctrine: “The critical issue, Title VII’s text indi-
cates, is whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous 
terms or conditions of employment to which members of the other sex 
are not exposed.”132 A woman who is denied job opportunities because 
she has rejected a supervisor romantically is close to the paradigm of 
quid pro quo harassment. She cannot help but feel pressured to enter 
or resume a sexual relationship, and such situations clearly pose a se-
rious threat to equal opportunity for women in the workplace. In prac-
tice, though, many courts have still viewed these cases through the lens 
of dominance doctrine, denying recovery on the grounds that the de-
fendant’s conduct was motivated by “personal animosity” rather than 
sexist animus133 and was thus outside of Title VII’s prohibition on al-
tering the terms and conditions of employment because of sex.134 The 
misogyny narrative in effect adds to Title VII a requirement that is ab-
sent from the statute and Supreme Court opinions. 
C. Me-Too Evidence 
In the extrajudicial sphere, the #MeToo movement has strikingly 
demonstrated the power of multiple charges against an individual to 
succeed where a series of isolated complaints had previously failed. At 
the same time, a chorus of charges invites a chorus of rebuttals. The 
defenders of individuals accused of misconduct, such as Brett Ka-
vanaugh and Bill Clinton, often stress evidence that the accused has 
treated other women well.135 Unfortunately, the strong misogyny theory 
supports the admissibility of this not-me-too evidence, which is obvi-
ously relevant to a charge of generalized animus towards women 
though less clearly germane to a specific charge of misconduct towards 
one woman. 
 
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT AT FIFTY (Samuel Bagenstos & Ellen Katz eds., 2014). 
 132 Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80 (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 25 (Ginsburg, J., concurring)). 
 133 See, e.g., Succar v. Dade Cnty Sch. Bd., 229 F.3d 1343, 1345 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that 
misconduct does not constitute sexual harassment if based on a “personal feud,” not gender). 
 134 The only exception occurs if the supervisor engages in behavior that would, standing alone 
and without reference to the past rejection, constitute sexual harassment, such as explicitly con-
ditioning better treatment at work on future romantic or sexual involvement. 
 135 Kelsey Bolar, Why His Female Law Clerks Are among Brett Kavanaugh’s Biggest Advocates, 
THE DAILY SIGNAL (July 11, 2018), https://www.dailysignal.com/2018/07/11/why-his-female-law-cl 
erks-are-among-brett-kavanaughs-biggest-advocates/ [https://perma.cc/JYQ3-FUXP];/; Gloria Ste- 
inem, Feminists and the Clinton Question, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 1998); Callum Borchers, Bill Clin-
ton’s Very Trump-Like Response to Questions about Sexual Misconduct, WASHINGTON POST (June 
4, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2018/06/04/bill-clintons-very-trump-li 
ke-response-to-questions-about-sexual-misconduct/ [https://perma.cc/S9GU-RT29]; USA TODAY 
(Jan. 12, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/life/2018/01/12/sexual-harassment-reckoning-201 
8-more-backlash-and-pushback/880479001/ [https://perma.cc/Z76L-7L4A]. (“Three-dozen female 
former Saturday Night Live employees publicly defended former SNL comic-turned Franken by 
declaring he never did anything to them.”) 
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This undesirable consequence of generalized misogyny theory has 
played out in the courts as well. The expression “me-too” evidence pre-
dates the #MeToo movement, and refers to evidence of discriminatory 
behavior, not necessarily sexual, towards an individual not a party to 
the suit. Its admissibility follows the general rules of evidence: although 
evidence of prior acts may not be introduced “for the purpose of proving 
action in conformity therewith,”136 it may be offered for other purposes 
such as proof of “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.”137 The strongest 
basis for the introduction of me-too evidence is generally thought to be 
proof of intent or motive.138 
In the 2008 Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn case, the Su-
preme Court held that the admissibility of me-too evidence “depends on 
many factors, including how closely related the evidence is to the plain-
tiff’s circumstances and theory of the case”139  by virtue of factors such 
as similarities in the treatment of other employees and the plaintiff.140 
Lower courts have treated Sprint as creating a narrow exception to the 
presumption that prior act evidence is inadmissible, and have some-
times excluded even me-too evidence that meets the Sprint criteria on 
other grounds, finding that the probative value of such evidence is out-
weighed by unfair prejudice141 or where it poses a danger of creating a 
“trial within a trial.” 142 One court stated that “more often than not, ‘me 
too’ evidence is not admitted at trial . . . ”143 
In response to me-too evidence, defendants have increasingly pro-
duced rebuttal witnesses to testify to the defendant’s respectful treat-
ment of women. In theory, the same principles guide the admissibility 
of me-too and not-me-too evidence. In the non-sex harassment discrim-
ination cases, this equivalence might make sense, since me-too and not-
 
 136 FED. R. EVID. 404(b). 
 137 FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(2). 
 138 Johnson v. United Cerebral Palsy/Spastic Children’s Found., 93 Cal. Rptr. 3d 198, 213 
(2009); Soza v. William Ziering, Inc., F035182, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 6398, at *27–29 (July 
11, 2002). 
 139 552 U.S. 379, 388 (2008). 
 140 See, e.g., Bennett v. Nucor Corp., 656 F.3d 802, 809–10 (8th Cir. 2011); Elion v. Jackson, 
544 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2008). 
 141 See, e.g., Johnson v. Interstate Brands Corp., 351 F. App’x, 36, 41 (6th Cir. 2009); Jones v. 
St. Jude Med. S.C., 823 F. Supp. 2d 699, 734–35 (S.D. Ohio 2011); Lewis v. City of Chicago, 563 F. 
Supp. 2d 905, 922 (N.D. Ill. 2008); Adams v. Austal, U.S.A., LLC, 754 F.3d 1240, 1258 (11th Cir. 
2014). 
 142 See, e.g., Lawson-Brewster v. River Valley Sch. Dist., 617 F. Supp. 2d 589, 595 (W.D. Mich. 
2008); Hall v. Mid-State Mach. Prods., 895 F. Supp. 2d 243, 272 (D. Me. 2012); McClendon v. 
Dougherty, No. 2:10-cv-1339, 2011 WL 4345901, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 15, 2011). 
 143 Andazola v. Logan’s Roadhouse, Inc., No. CV-10-S-316-NW, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73775, 
at *7 (N.D. Ala. May 24, 2013). 
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me-too evidence could plausibly deserve equal weight. If a plaintiff pro-
duces examples of other women paid less than they deserve, a defend-
ant should surely be permitted to show that women on average are paid 
as well as men. Pay discrimination might not be universal, but is gen-
erally directed towards a group. In contrast, a sex harasser might plau-
sibly treat women generally well but single out a small set of victims, 
such as those who seem easier prey by virtue of circumstance or tem-
perament. To compound the problem, courts seem to apply the Sprint 
rules more leniently to not-me-too evidence, virtually always holding it 
admissible,144 while sometimes excluding me-too evidence.145  
Judicial preference for not-me-too evidence poses a looming threat 
to sex harassment plaintiffs, and it demands a strong narrative in re-
sponse. The strong misogyny theory cannot supply that narrative. A 
theory of sexual harassment that treats sexual behavior as a specific 
manifestation of generalized animus has tremendous difficulty explain-
ing why a man who treats women generally well should single out a 
specific woman for misogynistic abuse in the form of sexual behavior. 
What is needed is a new narrative that can treat sex harassment as a 
gender-based wrong without characterizing it as a form of indiscrimi-
nate misogyny. The next Section outlines how such a new narrative 
might be constructed. 
IV. NEW NORMS OF SEXUAL HARM 
Propelled by dominance theory, the American law of sexual harass-
ment took the momentous step of recognizing nonviolent sexual harm 
to adult women without invoking the norm of chastity. At the same 
time, the hybrid misogyny narrative behind those legal rules views har-
assment as the conduct of a small group of toxic misogynists, a deeply 
flawed picture that has produced deeply flawed doctrine. 
Sexual misconduct is regarded by traditional sexual morality and 
first-wave feminism as an offense against chastity; by sexual autonomy 
theory as an offense against consent; and by dominance theory as an 
offense against women’s equality. Better legal doctrines require new 
 
 144 See, e.g., Elion, 544 F. Supp. 2d at 8; Howard v. D.C. Pub. Sch., 561 F. Supp. 2d. 53, 5553 
(D.D.C. 2008); Rodriguez v. Chertoff, No. CIV 05-546-TUC-CKJ, 2008 WL 5087209, at *1 (D. Ariz. 
Nov. 26, 2008); Pantoja v. Anton, 198 Cal. App. 4th 87, 87 (2011); United Cerebral Palsy/Spastic 
Children’s Found., 173 Cal. App. 4th at 759; Johnson v. Big Lots Stores, Inc., 253 F.R.D. 381, 386–
87 (E.D. La. 2008); Soza, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 6398. 
 145 See, e.g., Elion, 544 F. Supp. 2d at 8; Howard v. D.C. Pub. Sch., 561 F. Supp. 2d. 53, 55 
(D.D.C. 2008); Rodriguez v. Chertoff, No. CIV 05-546-TUC-CKJ, 2008 WL 5087209, at *1 (D. Ariz. 
Nov. 26, 2008); Johnson v. Big Lots Stores, Inc., 253 F.R.D. 381, 386–87 (E.D. La. 2008). See gen-
erally Emma Pelkey, The “Not Me Too” Evidence Doctrine in Employment Law: Courts’ Disparate 
Treatment of “Me Too” Versus “Not Me Too” Evidence in Employment Discrimination Cases, 92 OR. 
L. REV. 545 (2013). 
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narratives that build on the strengths of each of these models while 
learning from their limitations. 
A. Consent and Its Limits 
American society places tremendous value on individual auton-
omy and freedom of choice. A central premise of our moral thinking 
is the harm principle: only harm to third parties justifies interfer-
ence with individual decisions and interactions between consenting 
adults. The traditional law of sex deviated from these core principles 
by scrutinizing consent far less in sexual settings than in other set-
tings and by placing little value on women’s sexual autonomy. But 
in the past half century, sex law has become more consistent with 
these other broadly-held values. 
Consent has thus become the touchstone of the American ap-
proach to the legal regulation of sex. By the later twentieth century, 
the resulting laws and norms had improved women’s sexual and eco-
nomic freedom but left many women feeling unprotected from sexual 
predation. Many felt abandoned not only by the society against 
whose unequal institutions they struggled but also by liberal femi-
nism, which sometimes viewed complaints about sexual harm as a 
step backwards from hard-won sexual freedom and towards a new 
neediness, suffused with a neo-Victorian rejection of female sexual 
pleasure. 
Into this vacuum came dominance theory, which allowed women 
to protest sexual imposition without appearing querulous and 
wounded. Its rapid success in driving reform, however, had costs. It 
did to some extent revive stereotypes of female sexual coldness. It 
painted far too bleak a picture of male psychology and of a society 
that was rapidly improving its treatment of women. It is now a half 
century later, and a new theory of harm is needed, one that extends 
earlier autonomy models without the drawbacks of dominance the-
ory. 
The legal system’s notion of autonomy is primarily “thin.” Thin au-
tonomy requires only that agents be free from wrongful interference 
with choice, without consideration of their actual capacity to act on this 
freedom.146 Autonomy theory becomes “thicker” as it builds in more re-
quirements that consent be meaningful, and these extensions are an 
inherently value-laden exercise in defining new entitlements.147 Corre-
spondingly, the concept of coercion (a violation of autonomy) expands as 
 
 146 Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 1422 n.199 (citing ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM: 
KANT’S LEGAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 15 (2009)). 
 147 See SCHULHOFER, supra note 1, at ch. 4. 
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entitlements increase—coercion cannot be understood except against 
the background of entitlements. 
The two major reform movements before dominance theory relied 
in part on autonomy arguments, wholly in the case of rape law reform 
and partly in the case of age of consent reform. In both instances, they 
required an autonomy theory that, if not maximally thin, was at least 
no thicker than that embodied in other areas of law. Age of consent re-
formers placed great weight on the comparison between sex law and the 
law of contracts and property. If minors could not enter into a valid sale 
of personal property, it seemed only reasonable to limit their capacity 
to consent to sexual relations. More recently, autonomy theorists have 
made a compelling case that sex law provides less protection than anal-
ogous law governing theft or professional conduct.148 For present pur-
poses I will equate thin sexual autonomy with sexual autonomy based 
on entitlements found in non-sex areas of the legal system, although 
that is not entirely accurate, since those areas may already embody 
some thickness. 
Thin sexual autonomy does not support extending the law of sexual 
harassment, because the American legal system simply does not pro-
vide enough legal protection to employees upon which to build. Employ-
ers are relatively free to mistreat employees, whose main redress is to 
leave, an option facilitated by the relative mobility of the American la-
bor market. The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is 
available to employees only in the most extreme cases. The supervisor-
employee relationship is not subject to even remotely the level of scru-
tiny applied to relationships such as therapists and patients or adults 
and minors. Any new narrative of sexual harm must capture how sex 
differs from property, contracts, and other areas in which the law su-
pervises exchange relations. 
To see how the model of thin autonomy plays out, consider the fol-
lowing hypothetical. A male supervisor, J, conducts the onboarding pro-
cess for each new employee. After filling out paperwork, J provides an 
overview of company procedures. At the end, he tells many of the female 
new hires that he enjoys a quick hook-up after work, and that if she 
ever feels so inclined she should come to his office at the end of the day 
and they can repair to his place for the evening. He adds that this is 
completely voluntary and won’t affect her job. He does not ask for a re-
sponse, never mentions the subject again unless the employee does, and 
neither rewards those who accept his offer nor sanctions those who do 
not. 
 
 148 Id. at ch. 6. 
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Not everyone will characterize this scenario, by itself, as sexual 
harassment, though I would, but it surely at least provides evidence 
that could be part of a hostile environment case. But the thin autonomy 
model cannot easily even support its use as evidence. From its perspec-
tive, all that matters is that consent has been requested and any refusal 
honored. J has wholly met these requirements—his acts are not even a 
step in a troublesome direction. Professor Stephen Schulhofer, the au-
thor of a fascinating and important application of the autonomy para-
digm to sexual harm,149 suggests that autonomy theory can be modified 
to acknowledge the problematic nature of J’s behavior.150 He proposes 
extending the unwelcomeness requirement of current hostile environ-
ment doctrine to allow for more consideration of circumstances, noting 
that that in “many of the reported cases, a supervisor confronted his 
female subordinate with a crude, impersonal sexual proposal. It seldom 
seems plausible to think that the woman was delighted by the idea or 
that only reticence prevented her from suggesting such an encounter 
herself.”151 In such circumstances, courts should presume unwelcome-
ness. In other words, unless the subordinate’s actions had somehow re-
butted the presumption, the conduct would be evidence of harassment. 
In contrast, courteous advances of a personal or romantic character 
should not be presumed unwelcome, although a single gentle refusal 
should be sufficient to indicate that any future advances are unwel-
come.152 
The distinction between crude impersonal advances and romantic 
personal ones is onto something critically important that is not part of 
current doctrine and that goes a long way to describing why most people 
would consider J’s behavior disturbing. Precisely why this distinction is 
important demands further explanation. Autonomy theory typically 
honors the freedom to make offers. Schulhofer constructs an important 
new category in autonomy theory: lack of consent even to receive an of-
fer.153 To this point his account is consistent with autonomy theory, 
which would typically honor an individual’s explicit refusal to entertain 
offers. But his next move is more complex: he suggests that the nature 
of a crude impersonal offer constitutes a proxy for lack of consent. Au-
tonomy models generally disallow offers only if the counterparty is not 
legally competent to accept because, for example, she is a minor. 
Schulhofer does not advocate the complete legal incapacitation of sub-
 
 149 See generally id. 
 150 The example of J is not Schulhofer’s but is designed to explore his theory. 
 151 SCHULHOFER, supra note 1, at 186–87. 
 152 Id. at 187. 
 153 Id. at ch. 9. 
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ordinates, suggesting that a complete ban on relationships between su-
pervisors and subordinates would intrude too much on the freedom of 
mature adults, who not infrequently choose to enter such relation-
ships.154 And the special status that Schulhofer rightly accords to per-
sonal and romantic offers is not a pure proxy for welcomeness, as au-
tonomy theory would require. An indication of interest from a physically 
attractive supervisor is more likely to be welcome than one from a less 
fortunate colleague, but neither Schulhofer nor anyone else would sug-
gest that that should be legally relevant. 
Not only the nature of the offer but the existence of a supervisory 
relationship clearly affects our view of J, but again thin autonomy the-
ory cannot clearly explain why. Much of sex law reform has focused on 
instances in which victims of sexual harms received less protection than 
victims of harms to other interests such as property. But treating J’s 
proposal as presumptively unwelcome would extend the protection of 
sexual autonomy past the protection of property or other rights. Sup-
pose J had told new employees that he was an Amway distributor and 
they should consider him for their wellness and cleaning product needs. 
This would be distasteful, and a corporate employer might well prohibit 
such behavior in the event that it became common. Yet no court would 
invalidate such a purchase by a subordinate on grounds of duress. By 
regarding J’s behavior as legally suspect, Schulhofer (and I and others) 
are proposing to extend the protection of sex law beyond that provided 
by the law governing other areas.155 
Sex is different. Something about sex makes the supervisory set-
ting more problematic for a request for sexual interaction than for a 
request for a financial transaction or for non-sexual social engagement. 
Something about sex gives special valence to the respectful or crude 
quality of the request, making even certain offers presumptively objec-
tionable. But what is different? 
B. Beyond Thin Autonomy 
Autonomy theory is the dominant American approach to moral 
questions, but thin autonomy does not protect women from second-gen-
eration sexual harassment. What thicker model of autonomy, enriched 
by appeal to other values and entitlements, can do better? The first-
wave feminist attack on the double standard ultimately rested too di-
rectly on Christian ideals of chastity to be straightforwardly imported 
into today’s secular legal system. Dominance theory’s powerful narra-
tive was too dark to have broad public appeal, and from a theoretical 
 
 154 Id. at ch. 8. 
 155 Id. at 164–67. 
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point of view it contained no explanation of why men would seek to dom-
inate women or why they might choose sex as their means to this end. 
The harm principle upon which autonomy theory rests is ulti-
mately empirical in implementation. Whether given actions cause 
harm, and of what kind, is a question on which evidence can be brought 
to bear, and I will now sketch out some possible approaches to develop-
ing an empirically grounded theory of sexual harm that might augment 
autonomy theory. 
1. Sex is dangerous: a sex-neutral norm 
Sex and the activities that surround it have consequences that ex-
tend far beyond erotic desire and satisfaction. To start the journey to 
thicker autonomy with this observation is to acknowledge that sexual 
harm is not always about misogynistic abuse, though it may be, and 
that fact is important. But sexual harm may also be about sex, or even 
about love, and is no less dangerous in these instances. 
The sexual autonomy model seldom acknowledges the power of sex-
ual emotions, and does so almost always outside the context of legal 
harms. Advocates of stronger norms against casual sex often note that 
sex can lead to strong feelings of emotional attachment. These feelings 
of attachment could be relevant in a number of ways to the law of sexual 
harassment,156 but I will focus on the three fact patterns identified ear-
lier, which seem most likely to command a consensus in favor of extend-
ing the law. All three raise issues that touch on the many emotions be-
sides desire that can arise in sexual settings. 
When sexual advances are rejected or relationships are ended, the 
rejected party may experience pain, shame, anger, resentment, or feel-
ings of inadequacy. A rejected supervisor may thus have difficulty treat-
ing a subordinate fairly. Fearing this, a subordinate who wishes to re-
ject or end sexual contact may suffer great anxiety and or feel 
intimidated into sex even where there is no direct threat of harm. Re-
jected parties may feel this full range of emotions regardless of their 
initial intent: rejection is not fun whether advances were motivated by 
love, lust, or animus. Essentially the same emotions may be triggered 
when the problematic behavior is not a sexual advance but more indi-
rect behavior of the kind described in Baskerville. 
 
 156 For example, a number of cases address the issue of preferential treatment of sexual ro-
mantic partners. See generally, e.g., Miller v. Dept. of Corrections, 36 Cal. 4th 446 (Cal. 2005); 
Sherk v. Adesa Atlanta, LLC, 432 F. Supp. 2d 1358 (N.D. Ga. 2006); Stewart v. SBE Entertainment 
Group, LLC, 239 F. Supp. 3d 1235 (D. Nev. 2017). At some point, the law might well want to 
concern itself with these, but this extension would be more controversial than those proposed in 
this article.  
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Equally serious though less obvious problems can arise when the 
supervisor is the rejecting party. The rejector may wish to avoid the 
emotions of the rejected; fear awkward situations; have a jealous 
spouse; or simply want a clean break. For any of these reasons, a super-
visor who terminates a relationship may feel unable to return to a nor-
mal supervisory relationship, with detrimental effects to the subordi-
nate’s career. 
That love sometimes hurts is hardly a new insight—it’s hard to im-
agine popular music without it—but it has been curiously absent from 
discussions of sexual harassment. Perhaps the focus on misogynistic 
animus has been so single-minded that other types of danger have been 
ignored. Or perhaps the ethos of sexual freedom has made any allusion 
to the emotional dimension of sex seem vaguely old fashioned and puri-
tanical. Over fifty years have passed since the advent of the sexual rev-
olution, and it is now time to discuss these issues more honestly, with 
assistance from the growing body of empirical research on the emo-
tional consequences of sex. 
The strength of sexual emotions implies that truly free sexual 
choice requires more safeguards than truly free economic choice, espe-
cially in situations of unequal power such as the workplace. This obser-
vation, which I will call the dangerous-sex model, leads to a thicker au-
tonomy model, which, unlike the misogyny model, supports protection 
even from harms not motivated by animus. 
The dangerous-sex approach addresses some of the problem cases 
discussed earlier. Certainly it suggests that supervisory status be given 
much greater significance than it receives at present, in turn suggesting 
a different result in the jilted lover cases. Indeed, it identifies the prob-
lems in those cases as central to the understanding of the harm in sex-
ual harassment: any of the formidable emotions surrounding sex, not 
just the malign ones, render the supervisory relationship dangerous. It 
refocuses the issue in the me-too evidence cases. The plaintiff is not try-
ing to prove a general disposition to misogynistic behavior but to show 
a pattern of sexual behavior that is not necessarily manifested towards 
all women. The agency liability cases are more of a puzzle, since they 
make little sense even on their own terms. Of all three anomalies, they 
are most open to the complaint that they protect plaintiffs less from 
sexual harm than from other harms. In no other situation, including 
racial harassment, has Title VII’s policy of reconciliation been used to 
require internal reporting. Still, the misogyny narrative may have con-
tributed to this wrong turn by creating an image of sex harassers as so 
anomalously malevolent, so outside the normal range of behavior, that 
their peers could be relied on to recognize and respond appropriately to 
their offenses. The dangerous-sex model instead emphasizes that essen-
tially ordinary feelings and behavior become menacing when introduced 
299] SEXUAL HARMS WITHOUT MISOGYNY 333 
into an environment of power. From this perspective it is unrealistic to 
expect self-policing by employers. Supervisors are, almost by definition, 
worth more to employers than those they supervise, since they are paid 
more, and employers have an incentive to favor supervisors over their 
subordinates in disputes between the two. This favoritism may be rein-
forced by the stronger social and collegial ties that exist between people 
at the same hierarchical level. The current agency liability rules seem 
to assume that harassers are so seriously pathological that their col-
leagues can overcome the strong forces that make people reluctant to 
find against valued colleagues and friends. But if sexual harm can re-
sult from normal behavior at the wrong time and place, the insistence 
on internal dispute resolution seems wholly misguided. 
2. Developing new feminist norms 
The dangerous-sex model is sex-neutral not only in terms of the 
legal rules it suggests, which do not differentiate between men and 
women, but in its assumptions about male and female sexuality. In 
American law and society, neutral legal rules are the preferred ap-
proach to promoting sex equality, and American feminists have at-
tempted to avoid building assumptions about sex differences into their 
policy analysis. 
At some point, however, it may be worthwhile to consider differ-
ences between men and women in the consequences of sexual activity, 
and even to entertain the possibility that these differences are not en-
tirely environmental in origin. Neither the autonomy nor dangerous-
sex models make it easy to claim sexual misconduct as inherently a 
feminist concern, since both take fundamentally sex-neutral perspec-
tives on sexuality. Only the historically contingent fact of male eco-
nomic power, itself unexplained, makes harassment of more importance 
to women than men. Both the autonomy and dangerous-sex models 
avoid the excessive pessimism of the dominance model but both have 
the opposite flaw. They do not explain why women are more likely to be 
disturbed than men by sexual harassment, and they answer the ques-
tion of why sexual harassment is sex discrimination with only the 
wholly formal answer that the plaintiff would not have been treated as 
she was were it not for her sex. 
A number of theories might provide an account of difference. I dis-
cuss only one that has recently not received the attention it deserves. 
This approach focuses on differences in male and female reproductive 
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roles, and is not new to feminist theory. It can be found as early as Frie-
drich Engels157 and in several important second-wave feminists includ-
ing Simone de Beauvoir,158 Gerda Lerner,159 and Shulamith Fire-
stone.160 It is an approach that, though value-laden, is based on 
empirical observations about human behavior, as I believe future theo-
ries should be. This approach might be called the means of reproduction 
model, an allusion to the idea that patriarchies oppress women in order 
to give men control of the means of reproduction. 
Women get pregnant and men do not. The shadow of forced preg-
nancy falls across all potentially coercive heterosexual interaction even 
in a post-contraceptive era. Such fears explain in part why rape is trau-
matic in a way that other assaults are not. Perhaps it is less obvious 
why such intense fears can be triggered by situations in which the pos-
sibly of coerced intercourse is not imminent. Consider the case of Va-
lerie Baskerville, discussed earlier, whose supervisor told her, inter 
alia, that an announcement over the work PA system meant “all pretty 
girls run around naked,” and who indicated that his wife told him that 
his sexual interest in Baskerville was becoming too serious.161 The 
threat of sexual coercion was in the air, but surely it was not an imme-
diate possibility. Why was her situation more deserving of legal protec-
tion that that of an employee who suffers non-sexual abuse? 
To say that the threat of forced pregnancy drives women’s sexual 
fear does not require that that fear result from careful calculation of the 
likelihood of pregnancy. Evolutionary psychologists suggest that we 
have two distinct mental tracks.162 Domain-general mechanisms give 
humans some capacity to respond to novel situations. These work along-
side domain-specific mechanisms that have evolved by natural selection 
to respond to recurring adaptive problems of the environment inhabited 
by early humans. These domain-specific mechanisms operate not 
simply by telling us what to do, but by filling us with powerful emo-
tions.163 Though we are capable of fearing things for which no domain-
specific mechanism exists, our most primal reactions are ancient and 
 
 157 FRIEDRICH ENGELS, THE ORIGIN OF THE FAMILY, PRIVATE PROPERTY, AND THE STATE (1884). 
 158 SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX (H.M. Parshley trans. 1968) (1949). 
 159 GERDA LERNER, THE CREATION OF PATRIARCHY (1986). 
 160 SHULAMITH FIRESTONE, THE DIALECTIC OF SEX: THE CASE FOR FEMINIST REVOLUTION 
(1970). 
 161 Baskerville, 50 F.3d at 430. 
 162 John Tooby & Leda Cosmides, Conceptual Foundations of Evolutionary Psychology, in THE 
HANDBOOK OF EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY (David M. Buss ed., John Wiley & Sons 2005). Some 
evolutionary psychologists regard the emphasis on domain specific mechanisms to be the field’s 
single most revolutionary contribution to psychology. 
 163 Leda Cosmides & John Tooby, Evolutionary Psychology and the Emotions, in HANDBOOK OF 
EMOTIONS (M. Lewis & J.M. Haviland Jones, eds., 2d ed. 2000). 
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domain-specific. Children instinctively fear snakes but not cars, alt-
hough in modern life cars pose an incomparably greater risk to their 
safety. Domain-specific mechanisms are not finely calibrated to actual 
risk, and once triggered they are strong. Snakes in a glass cage or even 
in a photograph can inspire visceral fear, while cars do not. Similarly, 
the threat of sexual coercion is frightening even when victims know that 
the chances of actual coerced sex are small and the chances of resulting 
pregnancy are smaller. 
Feminists become understandably nervous at this point. The sug-
gestion that evolved dispositions play a role in sexual behavior conjures 
up the views of an early school of evolutionary psychology that might 
be called traditionalist, because it scientizes the traditionalist view of 
sex roles and it takes a restrictive view of female sexuality, grounded in 
part on empirical claims about women’s lower interest in sex.164 Later 
researchers such as Sarah Blaffer Hrdy,165 Jane Lancaster,166 and Bar-
bara Smuts167 have presented a very different picture of human sexual 
predispositions that allows for far more variation between societies and 
a much more expansive and complex view of female sexuality. This so-
phisticated theory is consistent with, and even helpful to, a feminist 
perspective on sexual harassment. 
All evolutionary psychologists agree on one foundational principle 
of sexual behavior, the theory of parental investment. Through preg-
nancy and its corollaries such a breastfeeding, human females have a 
much higher level of obligatory investment in each offspring. Women 
should be more discriminating in selecting sex partners, since the pos-
sibility of pregnancy make each copulation a greater potential commit-
ment of resources for a female than for a male.168 Early evolutionary 
psychologists took this to mean that women were interested only in 
long-term relationships in which they traded sexual fidelity for male 
provisioning.169 Later researchers pointed out the errors in this last 
leap. The possibility of pregnancy means only that females should be 
more sexually selective than males and prefer partners of high genetic 
quality. It does not imply a female taste for monogamy or long-term 
 
 164 See generally DONALD SYMONS, THE EVOLUTION OF HUM. SEXUALITY (1981). 
 165 Sarah Blaffer Hrdy, Raising Darwin’s Consciousness: Female Sexuality and the Prehominid 
Origins of Patriarchy, 8 HUM. NATURE 1 (March 1997). 
 166 Jane Lancaster, A Feminist and Evolutionary Biologist Looks and Women, 34 Y.B. OF 
PHYSICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 1 (1991). 
 167 Barbara Smuts, The Evolutionary Origins Of Patriarchy, 6 HUMAN NATURE 1 (1995); Bar-
bara Smuts, Feminism, the Naturalistic Fallacy, and Evolutionary Biology, 11 POL. AND THE LIFE 
SCI. 174–76 (1992).  
 168 Robert L. Trivers, Parental Investment and Sexual Selection, in SEXUAL SELECTION AND 
THE DESCENT OF MAN 136–179 (Bernard Campbell ed. 1972).  
 169 Symons, supra note 162. 
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relationships. Few mammal species are monogamous or have signifi-
cant paternal provisioning, yet in all females are more sexually selec-
tive. High status males tend to pursue numerous partners, while high 
status females tend to seek better partners, though sometimes quite a 
few of them.170 Sharon Stone once remarked that one advantage of be-
ing famous was that “I find I get to torture a higher class of men.”171 
The selectivity principle helps explain why coercive sex is more 
frightening to women than to men. Any act of coerced sex is potentially 
an act of coerced reproduction that could create an indestructible link 
between the victim and the coercer. Because sexual choice is of over-
whelming importance to females, powerful fear can be triggered by non-
copulatory sexual coercion, unexecuted threats of sexual coercion, in-
tercourse without risk of pregnancy because of age or contraception, 
and situations in which the threat of coercion is not immediate.172 Just 
as in any other aspect of human behavior and physiology, there is a 
wide range of individual difference, but for the average woman, the pos-
sibility of sex is more fraught than for the average man not because of 
lack of sexual desire but because the potential consequences of sex are 
far more significant. The reproductive component of sex can provide an 
explanation for why sex is different and why we might protect sexual 
autonomy more than other autonomy interests. At the deepest emo-
tional level, unwanted sex can never be just sex or just violence but is 
an act of reproductive coercion that simply has no analogue in any non-
sexual behavior. Pressure to buy Amway products from a supervisor is 
uncomfortable, but pressure to have sex is terrifying. 
Traditionalist evolutionary psychologists were wrong to leap from 
parental investment theory to the view that women seek only monoga-
mous long-term relationships, but their account of male psychology pro-
vides a new perspective that can bridge traditionalist and feminist ac-
counts of male domination. All evolutionary psychologists note that the 
long dependency of human infants means that paternal provisioning 
increases the likelihood of a child’s survival; that men are reluctant to 
support their children unless they can be certain about paternity; and 
that men highly value chastity in long term mates.173 Traditionalists 
 
 170 Sarah Blaffer Hrdy, “7 Empathy, Polyandry, and the Myth of the Coy Female,” Conceptual 
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 171 Lois Romano, The Reliable Source, WASHINGTON POST (May 13. 1993), https://www.wash-
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 172 Gerd Bohner & Norbert Schwarz, The Threat of Rape: Its Psychological Consequences on 
Non-Victimized Women, in SEX, POWER, CONFLICT: EVOLUTIONARY AND FEMINIST PERSP. 162–75 
(D. Buss and N, Malamuth, eds. 1996). 
 173 This observation, as noted earlier, has a long and distinguished lineage. See, e.g., HUME, 
supra note 13, at 331–32. More recently it has been made by both the early evolutionary psycholo-
gists and their feminist critics. For the early evolutionary psychology perspective, see Symons, 
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and others mistakenly assumed that extensive male provisioning was a 
universal—in fact, the relative economic contribution of men and 
women varies greatly between societies. They were correct, however, 
that the sexual division of labor leaves most reproductive tasks to 
women; that on average men make a higher contribution to subsistence; 
and that societies in which men make a large contribution to subsist-
ence are often organized to restrain female sexuality to ensure pater-
nity certainty through a sexual double standard.174 Societies with a dou-
ble standard vary in their requirements of female virtue, running the 
range from strict chastity requirements, often brutally enforced, to a 
looser expectation that women require men to display respect and seri-
ousness before becoming sexually intimate. But even in relatively per-
missive societies, women are strongly stigmatized for crossing the elu-
sive line between desirable hotness and repellent sluttiness, and the 
pain of this stigma is keenly felt.175 
The consequences of being labelled a slut are serious. Women cate-
gorized as sluts occupy an exceedingly low rung on the social scale. 
Many men regard them as outside the class of women eligible for long-
term serious relationships, and they are at much greater risk of sexual 
imposition—recall that until recently evidence of a women’s prior sex-
ual experience was considered compelling evidence against a rape 
charge. Often the suggestion of sexual experience in a woman is under-
stood to imply other negative personal traits. Thus, a supervisor who 
engages in a “crude, impersonal” sexual conduct towards an employee 
is indicating that she is a low status person who can be taken advantage 
of sexually and in other ways as well.176 
 
supra note164. For their feminist critics, see Lancaster, supra note 166. 
 174 In some societies, women contribute more than men to economic subsistence, and in some 
the kin of the mother rather than the father play the dominant role in supporting child-rearing. 
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quality partners at least as good as just one. Hrdy, supra note 163; Lancaster, supra note 164. F. 
W. Marlowe, “The Mating System of Foragers in the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample,” Cross-
Cultural Research 37, no. 3 (2003): 282; Marlowe.; Alice Schlegel and H.B. Barry III, “The Cultural 
Consequences of Female Contribution to Subsistence,” American Anthropologist 88, no. 1 (1986): 
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The means-of-reproduction framework therefore provides a view of 
sexual harassment not just as a wrong but as a discriminatory wrong. 
It fills a key gap in the autonomy model by providing a reason for ex-
tending protection to sexual harms past the level provided to property 
wrongs. Like dominance feminism and first-wave feminism, means-of-
reproduction feminism stresses role of sex in the social and economic 
control of women. Unlike these alternatives, it does so without resorting 
to norms of female chastity or assumptions about female sexual cold-
ness. Women are more sexually vulnerable not because of their fragility 
or lack of desire but because the possibility of pregnancy makes coercive 
sex frightening and makes the suggestion of sexual promiscuity degrad-
ing in ways it would not be to a man. The means-of-reproduction ap-
proach provides an account of why men might wish to subordinate 
women that is both more empirically satisfying than prior theories and 
less gloomy, acknowledging the variation among societies and individ-
uals and the possibility of movement towards more just social arrange-
ments. 
In the context of sexual harms, the means-of-reproduction model 
enlarges the perspective of the dangerous-sex model to clarify the spe-
cial emotional consequences of sex for women. Women are more sex-
ually vulnerable not because they are prudish or coy, but because sex 
has potentially far more significant consequences for them than it does 
for men. Society may help reduce that differential by expanding 
women’s reproductive rights, but human emotional responses are to 
some extent those of our ancestors in the environment of evolutionary 
adaptation. American law and norms favor formal equality, and the 
mean of reproduction perspective probably does not change the policy 
prescriptions of the dangerous-sex model. From a purely formal point 
of view, sex harassment is probably best thought of as a sex-neutral 
offense, a wrong because it would not have occurred but for the plain-
tiff’s sex. Sex differences are relevant because they inform the applica-
tion of the Harris factors: whether a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s 
position would have found the behavior sufficiently severe, threatening, 
or humiliating to constitute a hostile environment.177 
But narratives matter. Sexual neutral models perform important 
functions, but a complete picture requires something more. In practice, 
adopting a neutral perspective means a male perspective will determine 
the governing legal structures, and that has historically failed to protect 
women. Judge Posner could not imagine that he would have been upset 
by Hall’s behavior, and no doubt few men would have been. Narratives 
 
and Reason, 10 CONST. COMMENTARY 443, 467 (1993). 
 177 The only place that sex harassment doctrine has even fitfully considered sex differences is 
the reasonableness standard. See, e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991). 
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are needed not so much to provide doctrinal arguments as to enhance 
our ability to understand experiences beyond our own. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Subordination theory transformed the public and judicial view of 
sexual misconduct. Because its dark picture of pervasive misogyny was 
never broadly accepted, it metamorphosed into a meme of a small class 
of misogynists, driven by the need to dominate and control women, and 
deserving of both ostracism and legal sanctions. 
This powerful image of harassers enabled the law to expand liabil-
ity for sexual harassment past the narrow confines of explicit quid pro 
quo, but at the price of distorting the doctrinal elaboration that fol-
lowed. Sexual harassment came to be seen as essentially a form of rape. 
Sometimes, as in Meritor, it was. But serious sexual harm can also re-
sult from motives and behavior much closer to normal sexual conduct, 
a possibility obscured by the conflation of harassment and rape. If har-
assers were rapists, the coercive nature of the supervisory relationship 
needed no special recognition; most organizations could be counted on 
to self-police; defendants should be able to defend their character; and 
retaliation motivated by hurt feelings should be not actionable. All sex-
ual harm was rape, committed by rapists. 
Of course, not all sexual harm is the equivalent of rape, and not all 
men who cause sexual harm are the moral equivalent of rapists. The 
challenge now facing public policy is the regulation, whether by law or 
norms, of a vast gray area of motive and behavior. What kinds of harm 
short of that suffered in a violent assault should the law remedy? What 
is the relevance of motive? Some sexual harms will be unavoidably out-
side the law, but some intermediate harms are deserving of legal relief, 
especially those that occur in environments of unequal power.  A female 
employee may be seriously injured by the behavior of a supervisor who 
is immature or wounded but not malicious. As long as the misogyny 
narrative prevails, nuanced discussion of intermediate sexual harm is 
impossible. New narratives, such as those that stress the emotional 
dangerousness of sex, and perhaps even its special risks for women, are 
needed. 
New norms, however, require a shift in the rhetoric of culpability. 
If women are to be protected from sexual harm that is significantly 
short of rape, they cannot claim that that harm is equivalent to that of 
rape, or that it is inflicted by men who are essentially rapists. In a path-
breaking article twenty-five years ago, Professor Linda Krieger argued 
that discrimination, in the most general sense, was frequently moti-
vated not by animus but by a variety of unconscious biases. The result-
ing discrimination, she noted, was “unintended and, for many people, 
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earnestly undesired.”178 While arguing that the law should provide rem-
edies for unconscious discrimination, she cautioned against applying 
the same level of moral condemnation to those who committed uncon-
scious discrimination as to those who engaged in the paradigmatic de-
liberate variety. Inappropriate levels of censure, she predicted, would 
backfire, heightening tension and creating resistance.179 
New narratives of sexual harm require similar modulation in the 
rhetoric of blame. The dangers of overstating culpability can be seen all 
too clearly in the #MeToo moment. Astonishingly to many (or at least 
to many men), the #MeToo moment showed the ineffectiveness of the 
current legal system. At the same time, the dangers of a dichotomized 
view of male behavior were far more evident in the Twittersphere than 
they had been in the courtroom. In court, narratives of sexual harm are 
a subtle influence on the logic of the law, always present but not easily 
detected. In social media and on the Internet more generally, moral nar-
ratives are always front and center. The initial wave of allegations 
against individuals such as Harvey Weinstein involved behavior that 
was either rape or an extreme abuse of power whose immorality few 
questioned. The narrative of misogyny was rightly used in this setting. 
As the #MeToo movement progressed, new charges continued to raise 
issues central to the protection of women’s equality, but the conduct 
described became less extreme and fit less readily into the models of 
rape and misogyny. The behavior in question often involved suggestive 
language or touching. Some of the accused, like Garrison Keillor, may 
have been impelled, as Judge Posner said of Michael Hall, by immatu-
rity rather than by animus. The discussion shifted from professional 
settings, where the element of power transformed the creepy into the 
coercive, to the purely social, culminating in the claims made against 
Aziz Ansari involving callous but lawful conduct during a date. Yet 
these men received the same heavy artillery accusations of misogyny as 
did Weinstein.180 
Some commentators, including some feminists, noted that #MeToo 
disregarded crucial distinctions between widely differing behavior. 
Some critics went further, suggesting that concerns about anything 
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short of the most egregious conduct would rob women of their agency 
and even “strip sex of eros.”181 The view that the line must be drawn 
narrowly, to encompass only the most egregious behavior, was explicitly 
tied to the misogyny theory: “Shouldn’t sexual harassment . . . imply a 
degree of hostility?”182 
#MeToo supporters responded that no-one was actually equating 
leering sexual advances with rape. In some sense this response was cor-
rect. If pressed, most #MeToo advocates would no doubt agree that not 
all charges were equally serious. Yet there has been no sustained dis-
cussion of the many gradations of undesirable sexual conduct. And as 
Krieger predicted, condemnation in excess of what is warranted has 
contributed to backlash. Some contend that #MeToo is an effort to cre-
ate division between men and women, 183 while others insist that if they 
must worry about being accused they will simply avoid women profes-
sionally.184 Not all of these reactions deserve sympathy, but some seem 
to me the result of genuine confusion and resentment of a world in 
which the rules seem unclear and the penalties for transgression arbi-
trary. 
I have done little here to provide a practical guide for the perplexed 
on the specific categories of intermediate sexual harm. My more modest 
goals have been to make the case for moving away from the strong mi-
sogyny model and to suggest some paths that journey might take. With-
out new and less morally charged narratives of harm, there can be no 
discussion of how the law and social norms can make modulated assess-
ments of the culpability of those who cause sexual harm, and provide 
protection against significant sexual harms that are not motivated by 
misogyny. 
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